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Abstract
Over the last two decades San Francisco has been suffering from a worsening housing
shortage and affordability crisis, as housing production has lagged far behind job growth in
the city and the region. As San Francisco’s housing market is especially supply
constrained due to its unique geography, long-standing zoning laws, and convoluted
permitting process, it is especially difficult to add the needed housing at an acceptable
rate. Overall, this housing crisis has affected middle and lower income households the
most as many have been forced to relocate due to rapidly increasing rents.
In an attempt to stimulate housing production state lawmakers have chosen to use the
Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) process as a way to require cities like San
Francisco to plan for and build more housing, especially at affordable levels. This process,
which runs on eight year cycles, sees the state allocate mandated housing goals for each
city via regional government entities. Due to a series of housing legislation packages
passed in recent years at the state level the RHNA process was given more ‘teeth’ via
increased allocations, enforcement, and accountability. As such, for the next RHNA cycle,
running from 2023 to 2030, San Francisco is required to show the state that it can facilitate
the construction of over 82,000 units in eight years with 57% of these units affordable to
‘very low’ to ‘moderate’ income groups. This will require San Francisco to make significant
policy changes, including rezoning much of the city to accommodate for increased density.
If the city fails to do this it will lose substantial funding for affordable housing production as
well as certain controls over its local planning process.
While this new RHNA process will force up-zoning and land use deregulation in San
Francisco there is no guarantee that the required housing will ever get built. To build the
over 46,500 units of affordable housing allocated over the next eight years, 5,800 units of
affordable housing will need to be built each year. For reference, in San Francisco 5,000
units of total housing (both market-rate and affordable) have only been built in one of the
last twenty years (2016), and over the last ten years the average number of affordable
units built per year was 874 units. In addition, San Francisco is currently lacking the
necessary funding to meet its targets since the City is projected to need $19 billion to build
the required affordable housing over the next RHNA cycle. While the new RHNA process
may help address the overall housing supply shortage in the long run, without significant
additional state funding and new revenue streams San Francisco will fall well short of its
affordable housing goals, meaning the revamped RHNA process will do little to solve the
ongoing affordability crisis.
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1. Introduction
California is experiencing a severe housing crisis and the impacts of this have been most
acute in the city of San Francisco. For several decades the City has experienced a joint
housing shortage and aﬀordability crisis that has hit low to moderate income households
the hardest as San Francisco has become one of the most expensive cities for housing in
the world. In 2022, the median rent for a two-bedroom apartment in San Francisco was
$3,800, which is aﬀordable to a household earning $137,000 per year - a figure earned by
less than 40% of San Francisco households (Housing Element Update 2022a: 5). The
creation of jobs has also far outpaced housing production, putting significant pressure on
this supply constrained market. For example, between 2010 and 2018 there were 8.5 jobs
created for every one unit of housing produced in San Francisco (BLA 2019). This
disequilibrium is clearly an issue, and it is one that has been exacerbated by other Bay
Area localities, especially on the Peninsula, which have consistently oﬄoaded their
housing needs to San Francisco despite creating many more (high wage) jobs and having
more land available for housing development.
As this crisis continues to deepen, local and state lawmakers, as well as activists,
special interest groups, non-profits, and community-based organisations have all clashed
over how to solve the problem. While almost all parties agree that more housing is
needed both in the City and the region, the proposed way(s) to accomplish this are hotly
contested by the various factions and involve nuanced economic, political, and social
debates. At the local level, the City’s convoluted permitting process, fraught with
discretionary reviews and environmental appeals has worked to delay or eliminate
housing projects on many occasions, resulting in the construction of less housing overall.
Recent decisions by San Fransisco’s current Board of Supervisors have also received
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backlash from critics as multiple large housing projects have been voted down on such
appeals (e.g. 450 O’Farrell and 469 Stevenson).
Over the past several years, San Francisco’s housing woes, and the apparent lack
of action to address them at the local level, has also led to more scrutiny from the State.
In fact, in 2017 the California State Legislature passed a ‘housing package’ with fourteen
bills designed specifically to increase housing development and the production and
preservation of aﬀordable housing in California cities (Clare 2019: 397). This was followed
by another set of three bills in 2018 that aimed to clarify and strengthen the previous
package. The housing coalition that has emerged in the California legislature is spearheaded by a former San Francisco Supervisor turned State Senator, Scott Weiner, and his
bills have focused on increasing density via up-zoning and expediting permitting review
processes, among other angles. While Weiner’s larger-scale, more aggressive bills such
as SB 827 and SB 50, which called for zoning changes near transit throughout the state,
were met with significant backlash from local governments and community leaders,
ultimately failing, a lesser known bill, SB 828, which was passed as part of the 2018
package, may end up having the biggest impact yet.
The aim of SB 828 and the accompanying legislation is to give the State’s Regional
Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) process more ‘teeth' by imposing substantially
augmented housing allocations on California cities and putting legal guardrails in place to
prevent abuse and allow for enforcement. Since 1969, the state of California has
mandated that all its cities, towns, and counties plan for the future housing needs of
residents of all income levels, and since the 1980s this state mandate has operated on
eight-year cycles via a top-down approach (Clare 2019: 386-387).
For the RHNA process, the California Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD) uses a methodology developed by the Housing Methodology
Committee (HMC) to determine the total number of new units that each region must build
9

to meet their housing goals for each cycle.1 The required units are organized and
distributed into four aﬀordability levels: ‘very low’ income, ‘low’ income, ‘moderate’
income, and ‘above moderate’ income. The total number of units needed, as determined
by the HCD, is then passed on to regional councils of governments. For the nine-county
Bay Area, this is the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), which works with
planners from the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) to distribute the
allotted units to each city and county in the region. Once each municipality has been
allocated its housing goal for the upcoming RHNA cycle, local governments must then
update the ‘Housing Element’ portion of their ‘General Plan’.
A city’s General Plan, which is also mandated by the state, is designed to help local
governments guide their growth and development, and it includes seven different
‘elements’. These are: housing, land use, transportation, conservation, open space, noise,
and safety.2 One of the goals of RHNA is to ensure that each ‘Housing Element’
accommodates existing and projected housing needs for all income levels by showing the
locations where housing can be built and highlighting the policies and strategies necessary
to meet their housing goals. Specific aspects of the Housing Element include an inventory
of suitable sites to accommodate the RHNA allocations; an assessment of financial and
programmatic resources for housing construction; analysis of fair housing issues and
constraints; and anticipated policies and actions to address the projected housing needs.3
In each RHNA cycle jurisdictions must submit their Housing Element to the HCD for
review to determine whether it complies with state law. The HCD then provides written
feedback to each local government. HCD’s approval is required before a local government

1

https://abag.ca.gov/our-work/housing/rhna-regional-housing-needs-allocation

2

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/rhna/index.shtml

3

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/building-blocks/index.shtml
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can adopt its Housing Element as part of its overall General Plan. For the upcoming cycle,
Housing Element updates are due to the HCD by January 31, 2023.
Until recently the RHNA process has primarily been used as a way for the State to
gauge how well (or poorly) regions and cities have planned for or built the needed housing
and there were no significant consequences for failing to meet these state-mandated
goals. However, since the passage of SB 828 the methodology used to determine each
region’s housing allocation has been changed, which has led to much larger mandated
goals. These changes include4:
• Zoning land to account for homes not built due to under-production from the prior
RHNA cycle
• Zoning more land for residential properties if a state audit shows there is a shortage in
that community
• Boosting housing targets where home prices are far outpacing wage increases
• Doubling the amount of land intended to house very low- and low-income residents by
setting aside more properties for apartments and condominiums
Because of these changes, over the next RHNA cycle, which runs from 2023 to 2030, the
nine-county Bay Area has been allocated over 441,000 units by the State. Of these, San
Francisco was allocated 82,069 units to be built over the next eight years. In total, 57% of
all the new units allocated, or 46,598 units, must be aﬀordable to ‘low’, ‘very low’, and
‘moderate’ income earners.
In previous RHNA cycles San Francisco has consistently lagged behind on its
overall housing production goals, especially for ‘very low’ to ‘moderate’ income
households (i.e. aﬀordable housing). Although job growth in San Francisco has primarily
been in both high-wage and low-wage industries the housing produced has been

4

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB828
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predominantly market rate, for ‘above moderate’ income earners (BLA 2019; Housing
Inventory 2021). During the current RHNA cycle, which runs from 2015 to the end of 2022,
San Francisco was tasked with producing 28,869 total housing units. So far, 22,220
‘above moderate’ income (or market rate) units have been constructed, which is nearly
ten thousand units more than the RHNA goal of 12,536 units for this category (Housing
Inventory 2021: 15). In this same period, production of housing for ‘low’ and ‘very low’
income groups has lagged behind, as less than 50% (4,974 units) of the required 10,873
units have been built in San Francisco (Ibid).
However, the actual production totals are not the only data that is sent to the HCD.
In addition to completed units, the San Francisco Planning Department also reports
‘entitled’ or ‘authorized’ units, which have been permitted by the Planning Commission,
as progress towards their RHNA goals. These units are not yet built, and the Planning
Department acknowledges that not all filed building permits will necessarily turn into
constructed housing units since project plans and financing can change after a building
permit is filed. That said, there is increasing worry that San Francisco will not be able to
present a feasible ‘Housing Element’ to the HCD that provides an acceptable inventory of
building sites and anticipated policy changes, such as rezoning, to accommodate the
new RHNA allocation of over 82,000 units. If the Housing Element is deemed noncompliant by HCD, San Francisco would lose out on a number of state funding
opportunities and potentially lose authority over its rezoning and permitting processes.5
Although previous penalties for failing to meet RHNA requirements were primarily
monetary, the aforementioned reforms at the state level have made the ramifications of
failing to meet these goals more severe. For example, a law authored by Sen. Nancy
Skinner, SB 167, is designed to strengthen California’s 1982 Housing Accountability Act
(HAA). This law requires a local agency to legally defend its denial of low-to-moderate-

5

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/accountability-enforcement.shtml
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income housing development projects, and requires courts to impose a fine of $10,000 or
more per unit on local agencies that fail to do so.6 Other legislation designed to enforce
compliance at the state level include AB 72 (2017), which provides the HCD with
resources to enforce the state’s housing laws via lawsuits from the Governor and Attorney
General (rather than solely developers), and AB 215 (2021), which provides additional
enforcement authority for local agency violations and increases public review and
transparency of Housing Elements.
In addition, SB 35 (2017) allows developers to build projects ‘by-right’ (i.e. via
ministerial rather than discretionary review) that contain 50% aﬀordable units in cities that
are short of their lower income RHNA goals, thereby taking planning power out of the
hands of local legislative entities. This bill, SB 35, also updated the RHNA inventory
requirement, which forces cities to submit an accurate potential housing site inventory as
part of their Housing Element - an aspect that was previously ignored or submitted in
‘bad faith’ by municipalities (Clare 2019: 399). Additionally, private sector legal watchdog
groups, such as CaRLa (California Renters Legal Advocacy)7 and YIMBY Law8, have
emerged to ensure that cities comply with these new laws and that the State is enforcing
them. As such, meeting the RHNA goals for the next cycle is not only important for
providing the needed (aﬀordable) housing in San Francisco, but is also necessary for the
city to avoid litigation at the state level.
Because these laws were not in eﬀect for previous RHNA cycles the city of San
Francisco will need to make some significant policy changes in order to to submit a
complaint Housing Element in January 2023 in order to meet its newly mandated goals.
Given the new landscape this capstone aims to determine: 1) if San Francisco can meet
https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-element-memos/docs/hcdmemo-on-haa-final-sept2020.pdf
6

7

https://carlaef.org

8

https://www.yimbylaw.org
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its state-mandated aﬀordable housing goals in the next RHNA cycle; and 2) if the new
RHNA process will result in the production of more aﬀordable housing and increase
overall aﬀordability in San Francisco. Some key questions include:
• Are San Francisco’s housing allocations in the next RHNA cycle achievable?
• What policy changes at the local level are needed to meet these goals?
• Will the new RHNA process produce more aﬀordable housing in San Francisco?
• Is the RHNA process the right mechanism to increase aﬀordability in San Francisco?
• Is state assistance at the local level necessary for the city of San Francisco to achieve
its mandated goals?
As the state is increasing its power to manage and enforce local housing production it is
worth questioning whether these new laws and policies will have the intended eﬀect.
More housing at all income levels clearly needs to be built, but will these changes to the
RHNA process lead to more actual construction, especially of aﬀordable housing units?
How will this construction be funded? Should the State help pay for new aﬀordable units
given the lofty allocations?
Although the state legislature has remedied the main issue with the RHNA process,
which was a lack of accountability and enforcement, the state cannot actually force the
construction of new housing, aﬀordable or otherwise, if there is not enough funding or
investment readily available. To present a complaint Housing Element to the HCD that
provides a feasible plan for the construction of over 82,000 units in eight years, San
Francisco must present a legitimate housing site inventory, viable pipeline projects, and
accompanying policy changes (such as rezoning for more capacity) that allow for more
units to be constructed. Because San Francisco’s most recent Housing Element draft has
shown that the city does not have the necessary capacity to build the allotted units it will
be required to undertake a residential rezoning program for the first time since 1978
14

(Housing Element Update 2022b: 20). Although this rezoning is incredibly overdue, and
necessary to even attempt to achieve an equitable distribution of housing (both aﬀordable
and market rate) in San Francisco, the actual construction of these units will rely on
prevailing market conditions and/or government subsidies to be realized.
While up-zoning and increased enforcement/accountability can theoretically
stimulate housing production in California cities, a lack of investment could mitigate such
changes and have a chilling eﬀect on the overall housing economy. For example, in the
first four months of 2022 the San Francisco Planning Department saw applications for
only three new housing projects totalling 62 units, while in 2021, with the pandemic still
fully underway, there were seven applications for projects with 891 units in the same fourmonth timeframe (Dineen 2022a). For reference, during the peak of San Francisco’s
building boom in 2015, the Planning Department processed 17 applications totalling
2,084 units in this same period (ibid).
Although housing production has been steady overall during pandemic with 4,043
net new units constructed in 2020 and 4,633 added in 2021 - both above the 10 year
average of 3,478 units - the current lack of applications could point to an impending
downturn in the coming years, especially as construction costs, interests rates, and
inflation have risen significantly (Housing Inventory 2021; Dineen 2022a). According to
some developers, the current economic conditions are similar to that of the 2008
recession when investment into housing shrank considerably (Dineen 2022a). This
economic downturn also resulted in a drop-oﬀ of applications which produced an historic
low of housing production several years later when only 269 net new units added in 2011
(Housing Inventory 2021: 19).
The outcomes of rezoning (i.e. up-zoning) are also uncertain since there is no
guarantee that housing will actually be built on up-zoned sites in a timely matter. In fact, it
is possible that up-zoning could generate more transfers of property than actual
15

construction. In a study on Chicago that examined the outcomes of spot up-zoning on a
series of individual parcels that were tracked over a five year period, MIT researcher
Yonah Freemark (2019) found that the up-zoned properties saw significant increases in
transaction price, as well as an increase in existing condominium price. However, he did
not see evidence for any new construction in the period of study. As such, Freemark
(2019) concluded that “the short-term, local-level impacts of up-zoning are higher
property prices but no additional new housing construction”. A similar situation could
unfold in San Francisco, since without capital readily available to build, an up-zoned
property with increased potential for profit (e.g an older single family home on the west
side that could be turned into a 4-6 unit apartment building) could change hands several
times (at an increasing price) before any new units are actually built.
In addition, questions remain about whether these new laws will actually lead to
housing being added in the locations prescribed. For example, a recent study out of
UCLA using a sample of sites from 97 California cities during the 5th RHNA cycle had, on
average, around a 10% chance of being developed within the planning period (Kapur et al
2021). In San Francisco, the probability that a RHNA inventory site would be developed
over the 8-year cycle was between 7.3% and 9.7%. The share of actual units built on
inventory sites in San Francisco was between 29-33% of all units built, meaning that
67-71% of the units constructed during this cycle were on non-inventory sites, on par
with the rest of the Bay Area. If 70% of new housing is being built on non-inventory sites,
forcing cities to identify and up-zone sites that only have a one in ten chance of
development may not lead to more housing actually being built there.
The topic of regulation is also an important issue for housing production in San
Francisco. While the RHNA process will open up more sites for potential construction, the
permitting process in the City slows new housing development. Because building permits
in San Francisco are ‘discretionary’ rather than ‘by-right’ they must first be approved by
16

the Planning Department, which can take years in some cases. Overall, it has been found
that land use regulations work to slow new construction as a study on California cities
determined that for each additional regulation adopted, permits for multi-family homes fell
6%, and 3% for single-family homes (Jackson 2016). Indeed, the majority of studies have
found that cities with more regulations have higher home prices and less construction,
meaning that regulations make housing more expensive and harder to produce (Gyourko
and Molloy 2015: 42). As such, any legislation that aims to rezone San Francisco for more
housing should also be accompanied by legislation that allows for the streamlining of
housing production. Currently, the new RHNA process only forces cities to streamline
housing if their Housing Element is found to be non-complaint.
While the changes forced by the RHNA process will have cities in a better place to
expand their housing production, it is important to remember that the type of housing
production stimulated by up-zoning will primarily be market-rate units, financed by
developers. This should not be perceived negatively, however. New market-rate housing
is needed as San Francisco continues to add high wage jobs at a steady pace. New
market-rate housing has also been shown to take pressure oﬀ of rental sub-markets and
mitigate displacement (e.g. Somerville and Mayer 2003; Asquith et al. 2020; Pennington
2021). New market-rate projects also provide some aﬀordable housing via inclusionary
units, which represent 39% of all aﬀordable housing added in San Francisco over the last
five years, in addition to providing impact and linkage fees.
However, it is worth noting that developer-built inclusionary housing is generally
owner occupied by moderate income households while aﬀordable housing financed by
housing fees and built by city funded entities is primarily rental housing for lower income
households that targets senior, chronically homeless, and disabled individuals (BLA 2012:
45). Finally, as the RHNA requirements have increased and development costs continue
to rise, the overall financial feasibility of market-rate construction will be challenged (HAS
17

2020B: 13). As such, market-rate housing projects should not be relied upon for providing
the large amount of aﬀordable units required.
Although the new RHNA process will help with the overall housing shortage if
development follows up-zoning in a timely manner, it will do little to solve the overall
aﬀordability crisis, as this is an issue of funding rather than land use policy. Overall, the
eﬀect that new market-rate housing will have on aﬀordability at the lower ends of the
income spectrum will be minimal and/or too slow to have a significant impact, especially
as low income households are being priced out of San Francisco at a rapid rate. To
achieve true aﬀordability, units must be built in 100% aﬀordable buildings and/or removed
from the open market. This takes significant public funding and government coordination
to accomplish, but there are various methods and models that the City can employ to
bring more aﬀordable housing online. These include new progressive taxes (such as
Proposition I - 2020) to create new revenue streams; the issuance of state, regional, and
local bonds (including micro-bonds) for aﬀordable housing construction; the acquisition
and conversion/rehabilitation of older hotels and apartment buildings (especially those
with tenants at risk of eviction); and the streamlining of aﬀordable housing projects.
In general, building aﬀordable housing costs about the same as market-rate
housing to construct from the ground up, but it needs to be subsidized to be built. This is
where the RHNA process falls short. If the City fails to provide a complaint Housing
Element it will actually lose out on the state funding available, which will put it in a worse
situation when it comes to aﬀordable housing production. Although a failure to comply
will trigger the so-called ‘Builder’s Remedy’, which allows for all housing development to
be permitted ‘by-right’ rather than via discretionary review as long as a project is 20%
aﬀordable, this type of housing production will not help San Francisco reach its aﬀordable
housing goals as developers cannot be relied upon to provide the needed subsidized
housing, especially for lower income brackets. Although forcing accountability and upping
18

enforcement is a positive step, since it will keep cities on track and motivate them to
make progress towards their RHNA goals, this process needs additional state funding
attached to it. Rather than punishing municipalities by taking away funding if their
Housing Elements fail, the state should be helping cities like San Francisco reach their
otherwise unattainable aﬀordable housing goals. This ‘pay not punish’ model could help
provide the necessary, and currently lacking, funding to build the aﬀordable housing that
is so needed for the community and that has been neglected in previous RHNA cycles.
For San Francisco to meet its lofty state mandated housing goals for the next
RHNA cycle, 10,258 units will need to be built in the city each year for the next eight
years. However, only once in the last 20 years (2016) have 5,000 units been constructed
in San Francisco in one year, and there have never been 10,000 units built in any year
since the Planning Department has kept records. For San Francisco to meet its targets for
aﬀordable housing production (i.e. 'very low’ to ‘moderate’ income brackets) there will
need to be over 5,800 fully subsidized aﬀordable units produced each year. However,
over the last ten years an average of 847 net new aﬀordable units have been built per
year for all the aﬀordable income brackets combined (Housing Balance Report 2021: 5).
Finally, the cost to to build the required aﬀordable units over the next RHNA cycle
is extraordinary. In 2020 it was estimated by the City that the cost would be $7 billion over
the course of the cycle, or $875 million per year, to build the required aﬀordable units (San
Francisco Capital Plan 2020). However, a planning report provided to the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors on May, 19th 2022 has shown that the local funding gap for
aﬀordable housing construction in the first year of the new RHNA cycle is estimated to be
$1.3 billion9. Based on this report, the gap is predicted to increase each year until 2029
with a total predicted local shortfall of $14 billion over this seven year period analyzed.

https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=10905702&GUID=037E15BE-0136-4350AEA7-717766EF1472
9
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For perspective, the most the City has ever spent on aﬀordable housing was $503 million
in FY 2019-20, but this total is expected to drop in the coming years and will be well short
of the billions needed (see HAS 2020a: 2).
Given the current situation, San Francisco will not be able to achieve its RHNA goal
of building over 10,000 units per year over the next eight years. To achieve the aﬀordable
housing targets of over 5,800 units per year would require unprecedented building and
unprecedented public spending in the City. Without additional revenue streams, state
funding help, and local policy changes San Francisco will fail to meet its allotted goals by
a large margin. Even with the rezoning of the west side, the added capacity provided by
up-zoning may not become available for about three years, or roughly midway through
the next cycle (Housing Element Update 2022b: 20). It is also diﬃcult to say how much
housing will actually be built on these sites given past trends concerning up-zoning
outcomes and the low probability of development on RHNA inventory sites. Although the
new RHNA process is designed to stimulate more construction and increase enforcement
and accountability while doing so, it fails to account for the massive financial obligations
associated with aﬀordable housing production. While the new RHNA process and
augmented allocations may stimulate market-rate construction that could have a positive
impact on the overall housing supply over time, it will not solve for aﬀordability.
To explore this topic in greater detail this capstone is broken into seven sections.
Following the Introduction (Section 1) is the Methods section (Section 2), which describes
the data used and compiled for this project. Next, an historical ‘Literature
Review’ (Section 3) details the roots of the San Francisco housing crisis. This section
covers early race-based policies, the period of redevelopment and urban renewal in the
19050s and 1960s, the subsequent slow growth movement in the 1970s, and the tech
booms of the 1990s and 2000s. This section is followed by the ‘Data Analysis’ (Section 4)
which looks at recent trends in housing production in San Francisco, both aﬀordable and
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market-rate. Sub-sections examine changes in population, job growth, and incomes as
well as past and present funding streams for aﬀordable housing construction and
preservation in the City. This section concludes with an examination of San Francisco’s
previous RHNA production and proposed policy changes.
The subsequent section (Section 5) focuses on ‘Current Debates’ concerning
housing policy and housing politics in San Francisco and centers on the issues of supply
and demand, rezoning and deregulation, and proposed legislation designed to increase
capacity and stimulate housing production. This section concludes with a synopsis of
interview data obtained from six interviewees (see Section 2), which included local
housing activists/advocates, non-profit housing leaders, and housing developers. The
next section of this capstone, ‘Conclusions’ (Section 6), sums up the key takeaways from
this project and answers the questions laid out in the Introduction. The final section
(Section 7) contains a set of ‘Recommendations’ that outlines ways that San Francisco
could raise the needed funding for aﬀordable housing construction over the next RHNA
cycle. With slogans such as ‘build back better’ permeating the broader post-pandemic
discourse, as San Francisco enters its own recovery phase a set of clear
recommendations and realistic strategies that will help the City achieve its aﬀordable
housing goals is especially important.
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2. Methods

The overall goal of this project is to assess the new RHNA process to determine 1) if the
new aﬀordable housing goals are feasible and 2) if it is a viable policy mechanism to
address the aﬀordability crisis in San Francisco. To assess the new RHNA process and
San Francisco’s ability to meet these goals the history of housing and planning in San
Francisco is first examined with a focus on past policy decisions in the City. This is
accomplished via a detailed literature review that covers a variety of publications
including books, academic journals, city reports, and news sources. Next, recent and
current data on housing trends and housing stock in San Francisco are complied and
examined. Here, data from the San Francisco Planning Department regarding the city’s
housing stock and housing production, both market-rate and aﬀordable, is examined in
detail. This section also looks at changes in population, job growth, rents, and incomes in
the City over the past decade using various city reports. Past and present funding
streams for aﬀordable housing construction and preservation in San Francisco are also
presented to better understand how such construction has been subsidized by the City in
the past and how much funding is needed to meet the new RHNA goals.
Next, current housing policy debates in San Francisco and California are discussed
in greater detail. In this section the hotly debated topics of supply and demand, rezoning,
and deregulation are outlined, analyzed, and critiqued. Current and forthcoming
legislation at the state and local level that pertains to San Francisco’s RHNA goals for the
upcoming cycle is also discussed and analyzed. To add further nuance to these debates,
interview data on these subjects was gathered from local housing activists/advocates,
non-profit housing leaders, and housing developers.
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List of Interview Participants (in alphabetical order):

1. Todd David - Executive Director of the Housing Action Coalition (HAC)
Todd David has been HAC’s Executive Director since November 2016, and has been
active in Bay Area politics throughout his professional career. His campaign experience
includes serving as political director for Scott Wiener’s first successful California State
Senate campaign (2016), campaign manager for the Recreation and Park funding
measure (2016), and campaign manager for the Soda Tax (2014).10

2. Oz Erikson - Principal/Chairman of the Emerald Fund
Oz Erickson founded Emerald Fund in 1979 and has been actively developing projects in
the Bay Area since that time. Erickson identifies new projects and is involved with the
entitlements, financing, project design, and sales and marketing. Erickson has been
recognized with many industry honors including the San Francisco Business Times’
Lifetime Achievement Award for Most Admired CEO in 2013. He received a BA degree
from Harvard University and a MBA from Stanford University.11

3. Laura Foote - Executive Director of YIMBY Action
Laura Foote became a housing activist in 2014 as one of the key founders of the YIMBY
movement. As Executive Director of YIMBY Action, Foote has grown the organization into
a thriving grassroots political organization of thousands of volunteers. As of 2021, YIMBY
Action has over 3,000 supporters nationwide and is made up of nearly 20 chapters in

10

https://housingactioncoalition.org/our-team/

11

https://www.emeraldfund.com
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cities across the country. Foote is widely recognized as an authority on eﬀective housing
activism in the US and holds a B.A. in Economics from Hamilton College.12

4. Fernando Martí- Co-Director Council of Community Housing Organizations
(CCHO)
Fernando Martí is co-director of the Council of Community Housing Organizations
(CCHO), a coalition of 21 community- and faith-based aﬀordable housing developers and
housing justice advocates based in San Francisco, that works to foster the development
of permanently aﬀordable housing under community control and through non-speculative
means of ownership. Martí is also a printmaker, installation artist, community architect,
writer, and activist. He was born in Guayaquil, Ecuador, and has made his home in San
Francisco since 1992.13

5. Sam Moss - Executive Director of Mission Housing Development Corporation
Sam Moss started with Mission Housing in December 2011 as an Asset Manager and
became Executive Director in September 2013. Moss oversees the administration of all
Mission Housing assets, programs and services. He is often in meetings at City Hall and
throughout various San Francisco communities pushing for more support of the
Aﬀordable Housing industry. On other days, his time at Mission Housing might be spent
with issues like human resources, operations, budgets or board meetings.14

12

https://yimbyaction.org/2021/people/laura-foote/

13

https://ced.berkeley.edu/ced/faculty-staﬀ/fernando-marti

14

https://missionhousing.org/profiles/sam-moss/
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6. Calvin Welch - Author/activist/advisor
Calvin Welch received his BS in Interdisciplinary Social Science from San Francisco State
University and his MA in Political Science from Makerere University College, Kampala,
Uganda. Welch has served on various city task forces and advisory committees on issues
ranging from aﬀordable housing, to financing, to living wage. He has also served as
campaign a manager or on campaign committees of a number of citizen initiatives.15

The Interview
Each interview participant was asked the same set of questions and recorded via Zoom.
Each interview was designed to be between 35-45 minutes in duration (although some
went longer). The questions for each interviewee were as follows:
• How long have you worked on the topic of housing in San Francisco?
• What made you want to focus on this topic?
• One word to describe San Francisco’s housing crisis?
• What are the biggest blocks to building aﬀordable housing in San Francisco?
• What are some potential solutions?
• What would be the first thing you would change about current zoning laws in San
Francisco?
• Do you think San Francisco and California should be investing in the procurement and/
or construction of more public housing?
• What is best way to do this, in your opinion?
• Do you think San Francisco can meet its RHNA goals in the next cycle?
• If no - why?; If yes - why?
15

https://www.usfca.edu/faculty/calvin-welch

25

• Do you think state intervention or assistance is needed for San Francisco to reach its
mandated goals?
• What is the right level of state intervention or assistance at the local level?

The content of these interviews is synthesised and analyzed thematically in Section 5.6.
This is followed by the Conclusions section (Section 6), which assesses the ability of the
new RHNA process to achieve its desired outcomes based on the data presented, and
answers the primary questions laid out in the Introduction. Finally, a set of
Recommendations (Section 7) are provided that could help the city acquire the necessary
funding to meet its lofty state allocations for aﬀordable housing.
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3. Literature Review: The History of Housing and Planning in San Francisco: Policy
and Practice
This review covers three general bodies of literature that are pertinent to this project. The
first focuses on the history of housing and planning in San Francisco with a specific
emphasis on the City’s poor track record concerning race related housing policies and
their impacts on the physical layout and demographic makeup of the city. The next
section focuses on one of the most influential and impactful periods of housing history in
San Francisco - the 1960s through the 1980s. In particular, the shift from heavy
redevelopment agendas to progressive slow growth ideals is discussed and assessed in
relation to the overall supply and aﬀordability of the city’s housing stock. In the third
section, more recent housing debates and decisions playing out in San Francisco and the
wider region over the past 30 years are examined. Here, the eﬀects of development
policies, as well as the technology booms and their outcomes, are detailed to better
understand how San Francisco arrived at the housing situation experienced today.

3.1 Race and Place in San Francisco Housing: 1850s-1960s
The history of racially exclusive zoning and housing practices in San Francisco is well
documented in a report titled 'Roots, Race, and Place: A History of Racially Exclusionary
Housing in the San Francisco Bay Area’ by Eli Moore, Nicole Montojo, and Nicole Mauri
(2019). In this piece, the authors discuss the long-standing history of racism inherent in
many San Francisco zoning ordinances, which first targeted Chinese and Japanese
residents in the 1800s, and then African American and Latinx inhabitants in subsequent
decades. Here, the authors remind of seminal zoning laws used to segregate populations
by race and income that originated in the Bay Area and became widely popular
throughout the country. Some examples include the anti-Chinese ordinances of the late
1800s, including the Bingham Ordinance, the Cubic Air ordinance, and the Laundry
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Ordinance that were used to criminalize the
housing and businesses of the Chinese
community (see Fig. 1). The authors also
detail Berkeley’s 1916 zoning ordinance,
which established exclusive single-family
residential zones and was widely adopted
throughout the US (Moore et al. 2019 n.
24). This ordinance was subsequently
heralded by Califor nia Real Estate
magazine as a “protection against the
invasion of Negroes and Asiatics” (Weiss
1986).
Moving to the early 20th century,
Marc Weiss’ (1988) article in Planning
Perspectives titled ‘The real estate industry
and the politics of zoning in San Francisco,

Figure 1: The cover of the San Francisco
Illustrated Wasp depicts the jailing of Chinese
lodging house residents following the adoption
of the Cubic Air Ordinance (March 2, 1878)
(from Moore et al. 2019 n. 113; Courtesy of the
Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley).

1914–1928’ discusses how early zoning
practices were designed to protect high-income areas and reinforce patterns of existing
wealth in San Francisco. According to Weiss, early zoning practices were largely
influenced by wealthy landowners, mortgage lenders, real estate agents, insurers, and
builders. While zoning laws were strictly enforced around wealthy neighborhoods, they
were frequently manipulated around working class areas to create land use or price
change desirable to powerful lobbyists. In this period, the changes requested were
frequently granted by the Board of Supervisors when “accompanied by appropriate
private compensation” (Weiss 1988: 317).
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Although the practice of zoning was profit driven, it was also decisively racially
motivated. In an article that briefly details the history of ‘redlining’ in San Francisco
neighborhoods, Nuala Sawyer (2014) describes how federal banks refused to oﬀer home
loans to non-white citizens beginning in the 1930s, which triggered deep-seated patterns
of racial segregation and disenfranchisement in the City. In 1935, during the Great
Depression, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board asked Home Owners' Loan Corporation
(HOLC) to make residential ‘security maps’ that were colored by grade from green to red,
with green being the most desirable for investment and red the least desirable. According
to HOLC, neighborhoods marked red were "characterized by detrimental influences in a
pronounced degree, undesirable population or infiltration of it… Unstable incomes of the
people and diﬃcult collections are usually prevalent”. In San Francisco ‘redlined’
neighborhoods included the Western Addition, the Haight, Chinatown, parts of the
Mission, Visitacion Valley, and other areas that were predominantly non-white at the time
(Sawyer 2014) (Figure 2, below).

Figure 2: A Residential Security Map of San Francisco made by HOLC in 1937. NB:
color coding: green for the “Best,” blue for “Still Desirable,” yellow for “Definitely
Declining,” and red for “Hazardous (from University of Maryland’s T-RACES project).
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As Richard Rothstein (2017: 6-7) describes in his book, The Color of Law, federal
home loans were necessary to buy a house during the 1930s and 1940s, but as many
Black individuals who immigrated to the Bay Area for work during World War II were
denied these loans they were unable to purchase houses and forced to live in hastily
constructed shanty-towns. As a large population boom occurred in the Bay Area following
the conclusion of the War, homeowners that were given loans to purchase were able to
sell their homes for incredible profits, while those denied home loans faced rising rents
and deteriorating properties. In the instances where Black families were allowed to
purchase homes in ‘colored’ neighborhoods, they were sold at very high prices, making it
diﬃcult for homeowners to pay mortgages without additional renters, which created more
density and a higher strain on housing infrastructure (Rothstein 2017: 13). Since the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA), as well as private insurance companies, would not
insure mortgages in integrated, mixed-race neighborhoods the result was the creation of
extremely segregated neighborhoods that are still in existence today (Rothstein 2017:
12-14).
To cope with the booming population and lack of housing in the 1940s, the San
Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA) begin to construct public housing to replace
substandard dwellings. However, as Amy Howard (2014) recounts in her book, More than
Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing, the SFHA adopted
and upheld race-based policies that would impact its public housing program for
decades. The appointment of John Beard as head of the SFHA in 1943 ensured that
segregationist approaches held strong for his 22 years in that role. As Howard (2014:
14-15) describes, Beard wielded sole power over tenant selection for housing allocation
and used race-based placement to reinforce housing segregation while also denying
tenants the right to organize or unionize, despite opposition from civil rights activists and
the Board of Supervisors.
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When Congress passed the Housing Act in 1949 the SFHA was awarded federal
funding to build much needed public housing; however, as Howard (2014: 16-17)
explains, the vague language of the Act with a focus on ‘urban redevelopment’ left room
interpretation. To manage these federal funds and projects the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) was created as a semi-autonomous building authority
governed by mayoral appointees and headed by M. Justin Hermann, who had previous
experience obtaining federal funding for redevelopment (Habert 1999; Howard 2014:
16-17). Because the Housing Act sanctioned the ‘redevelopment of substandard
dwellings’ by local governments, the SFRA was able to use federal funding to demolish
low-income neighborhoods in order to construct oﬃce buildings, shops, parking lots, and
luxury apartments in pursuit of higher tax revenue (Howard 2014: 16-17). These
redevelopment projects served to displace thousands of low income residents in the
name of ‘slum clearance’ and destroyed large swathes of aﬀordable housing that was
predominately inhabited by communities of color.
One of the neighborhoods hit hardest by this redevelopment, or ‘urban renewal’,
was the Fillmore and the Western Addition. As Rachel Brahinsky (2011) recounts in an
article focused on the rise and fall of the ‘Black Fillmore’, the Fillmore had become one of
the city’s primary majority African American communities following the World War II labor
influx. This was largely due to the vacancy of units in the district that were left by
Japanese Americans forced into internment camps during the War as well as the
existence of racial covenants in other neighborhoods. According to Brahinsky (2011:
142-143), a coalition of downtown business owners that sought to revamp certain areas
of the city used the banks and the media to label the Fillmore as ‘blighted’ and in need of
redevelopment by the SFRA.
In 1953 the first bulldozers began demolishing buildings in the 44-block Western
Addition A1 area. While building owners were not technically evicted, the lack of loans
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provided due to redlining practices discussed above allowed structures that had fallen
into disrepair to be devalued by the SFRA. By the time the A-1 demolition was complete
in the mid-1960s, over 4,000 people had been displaced with no relocation assistance.
Shortly after the completion of A-1, a larger, 60-block A-2 project was underway. As
Brahinsky (2011: 144-145) explains, while this project was met with much stiﬀer
community resistance, by the time it was completed in 1970 roughly 10,000-13,000
individuals had been displaced, 2,500 Victorians had been demolished, and 883 business
had closed while little had been rebuilt (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Aerial photo of the redevelopment site in the Fillmore in the 1970s (From
San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library).

In his book, Housing the City by the Bay, John Baranski (2019) discusses how
strides were made by tenant unions and associations over the course of the 1960s and
1970s in response to the racial and economic discrimination inherent in the San Francisco
housing market. In 1968 the Civil Rights Act, which was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson, contained the Fair Housing Act that banned the refusal to sell or rent
a dwelling to any person because of their race, color, religion or national origin
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(McCartney and Pratt 2003). The Act also allowed for better enforcement of housing
discrimination claims including neglecting maintenance, restricting access or amenities,
and/or coercing, threatening or intimidating tenants. While the 1960s saw some wins for
civil rights and housing activists in San Francisco overall, long-standing segregationist
housing policies had already left deep scars in the city’s urban fabric that can still be
identified today (see Figure 4).
The results of the policies and practices highlighted in Figure 4 include the concentration
of wealth and poverty in specific neighborhoods and districts throughout the City, the
displacement and gentrification of established communities of color, the lasting eﬀects on
public health related to environmental injustice, and ongoing discrimination in the housing
market due to manufactured wealth disparities (Moore et al. 2019).

Figure 4: Timeline showing racially exclusionary policies and practices in the Bay Area from
the 1800s to 1970 (from Moore et al. 2019)
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3.2 From Redevelopment to ‘Slow Growth’: Consequences for San Francisco’s
Housing Stock
Despite some victories for tenants and civil rights leaders in San Francisco, from the
mid-1960s to the late 1970s redevelopment reached its peak in the City. Following the
Fillmore and the Western Addition, the next area targeted for large-scale ongoing
redevelopment was the South of Market Area (SOMA). In 1966 plans were approved by
the Board of Supervisors to turn an 87-acre plot of land south of Market Street into the
Yerba Buena Center - complete with oﬃce buildings, luxury apartments, and a convention
center (Rubin 1997). While this area of the city was notorious for being San Francisco’s
‘skid row’, it was also home to 4,000 residents (many living in residential hotels) and 700
small business that would have to be removed for construction (Rubin 1997). As Chester
Hartman (2002: 44-45) recounts in his book City For Sale: The Transformation of San
Francisco, the proximity of SOMA to downtown made it especially desirable for
redevelopment - as Justin Herman, Executive Director of the SFRA, notoriously stated:
“this land is too valuable to permit poor people to park on it”.
Yet, the project-area residents would not go without a fight, and in 1969 several
hundred of them formed an organisation called ‘Tenants and Owners in Opposition to
Redevelopment’ (TOOR). TOOR was mostly composed of (former) workers, unionists, and
established community members that identified as Democrats and sought to resist and
delay redevelopment through litigation (Hartman 2002: 68-70). Although TOOR was
successful in delaying the construction of new buildings, they could not stop the
demolition of many residential hotels and neighborhoods and the eventual completion of
the project. However, in 1973 a settlement was reached that gave TOOR’s development
arm, Tenants and Owners Development Corporation (TODCO), four plots in the
redevelopment area for the construction of 400 units of aﬀordable housing, while the
SFRA committed to providing another 1500 units of replacement housing for low income
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residents (Hartman 2002: 216; Rosen and William 2014: 130). While this was a major win
for residents and activists, this project marked the beginning of what was to be a long
process of SOMA redevelopment that would span the political lives of five mayors
(Hartman 2002: 24).
As Calvin Welch (2011) describes in his article, A Right to Stay, between 1968 and
1978 San Francisco experienced a number of very significant changes to its economy
and built environment. These included the shift of the maritime economy from San
Francisco to the East Bay, which saw a huge loss of industrial jobs; the creation of the
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, which brought suburban oﬃce workers to the city;
the rise of Silicon Valley as a jobs hub; the designation of 11 urban renewal areas (that
demolished primarily low-income, aﬀordable
housing); and an explosion of commercial oﬃce
buildings - all in an attempt to make San Francisco
a ‘corporate headquarters' of the West (Welch
2001: 155-156). The early 1970s in particular
marked a period of big building, with skyscrapers
such as the Transamerica building, and the
construction of freeways, oﬃce parks, and city
infrastructure that increased the number of jobs
while limiting housing supply (see Fig. 5).
According to Rosen and Sullivan (2014:
125-126) in their work on the history of aﬀordable
housing policy in San Francisco, as oﬃce workers
displaced industrial workers and as residential real
estate values rose rapidly due to lack of available
stock, San Francisco went from one of the

Figure 5: The ‘Ultimate Highrise’
published in 1971 by the San Francisco
Bay Guardian newspaper in support of
growth restrictions on San Francisco’s
downtown development (from
Archive.org).
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cheapest cities to live in the Bay Area to one of the most expensive. In fact, from 1965 to
1980 thirty-six million square feet of oﬃce space was added to the city, along with
166,000 new jobs (Hartman 2002: 3; 295-6). In this same period (1965-1980) housing
prices in San Francisco went from $3,000 over the national average to $53,000 over
(Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 125-126).
In another piece by Welch (1996) on the history of aﬀordable housing, he states
that from 1967 to 1979 public and private actions resulted in the demolition of over 7,000
residences and 5,300 residential hotel rooms. The majority of these units were rentals in
buildings of five or more units that were aﬀordable to lower and fixed income residents
and families in SOMA and the Western Addition (Welch 1996). To combat these losses as
state law was passed in 1976 that required the creation of new, one-for-one replacement
housing for any destroyed dwelling units occupied by ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income
families.16 This law also required 20% of the housing created in redevelopment areas to
be aﬀordable to low and moderate income households and allocated 20% of the
developer tax increment revenues to fund this requirement (Rosen and Sullivan 2014:
131). Despite these eﬀorts, there was still a net loss of 6,709 aﬀordable housing units
caused by SFRA’s redevelopment prior to 1976 that were still not rebuilt as of 2000.17
The response to this so-called ‘urban renewal’ and the rapidly rising skyline that
accompanied it was the birth of powerful tenant-led movements that served to put a stop
to the practice of large-scale, publicly funded projects. In the 1970s, during the height of
the redevelopment era in San Francisco, neighborhood groups began to become
‘experts’ in urban planning issues, going from defensive to oﬀensive via lawsuits,
planning and zoning controls, and ballot initiatives (Welch 1996). The passage of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which mandated that developers create an

16

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33410-18
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https://sfocii.org/senate-bill-2113
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Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for projects requiring discretionary review, was also
implemented by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1973. This resulted in greater
public input and more appeals than ever before as any citizen could now directly
challenge a project without persuading the Board to review it.
This same year, President Nixon placed a moratorium on federal funding for
housing projects, stopping the process of ‘up front’ funding for large scale clearance
projects and instead diverting federal funding directly to the Mayor’s oﬃce where it would
have to compete with other local programs (Habert 1999). When this occurred, the former
head of the city’s Planning Commission, Allan Jacobs, pressured the city to pass Urban
Design Guidelines, which gave his department discretionary review power over most new
building designs, as he describes in his book Making City Planning Work (1978). Here,
Jacobs also discusses how his new citywide density plan forced the Board of Supervisors
to pass the Height and Bulk ordinance in 1972, which drastically limited the size of all new
constructions (see Fig. 6).

Figure 6: A map from San Francisco’s 1971 Urban Design
Plan. NB: Height restrictions and concentration of allowed
density on the east side (from Oatman-Stanford 2018).
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As discussed by Hunter Oatman-Stanford (2018) in a long-read article titled
‘Demolishing the American dream: How San Francisco planned its own housing crisis’,
the slow-growth, preservationist movement culminated in 1978 with the Board of
Supervisors’ decision to approve a controversial residential rezoning plan that codified
40-foot building-height limits for most residential areas, lowered density requirements,
and imposed set back rules that served to preserve the ‘character’ of residential
neighborhoods (Oatman-Stanford 2018). While backers of this rezoning plan primarily
aimed to limit excessive ‘oﬃce creep’ and the continued expansion of downtown into
adjacent residential neighborhoods, this legislation also had significant consequences for
housing in San Francisco that would be felt in subsequent decades.
According to the planning department’s own EIR, these zoning changes would
reduce the amount of housing that could be legally built by 180,000 units, equal to a
roughly one-third drop in the city’s potential for growth (Oatman-Stanford 2018). While
this was seen as a win for neighborhood groups and environmental activists pitted
against real estate developers and the machinations of urban redevelopment, it
unintentionally solidified the foundations of a massive, impending housing crisis.
According to Oatman-Stanford (2018), while the creation of stringent zoning preserved
the newly established suburban character of certain (often white) communities it severely
limited the construction of new aﬀordable housing and further contributed to the overall
housing shortage. Yet, these outcomes were not unforeseen. As discussed by OatmanStanford (2018), in 1978, Rai Okamoto, director of the Planning Department, expressed
fears to the San Francisco Chronicle that downzoning the city would raise housing costs
and force middle-income residents out of San Francisco.
As such, i is perhaps not surprising that Calvin Welch (1996), when describing the
1970s, states that “the roots of San Francisco's current housing aﬀordability crisis can be
traced back to this period in particular”. At the same time San Francisco was downsizing
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via zoning, several other major events occurred that would have further impacts on the
city’s housing stock and aﬀordability. First, on June 6th, 1978, voters passed Proposition
13, which capped property taxes at 1% of their assessed value (in 1976) and restricted
annual increases of assessed value to an inflation factor, not to exceed 2% per year until
the property was sold and its taxes were reset at the new market value. As Jeﬀery
Chapman (1998) describes in his paper on the unintended consequences of Proposition
13, the lead up to this so-called tax reform initiative was based on rapidly increasing
housing costs that led to fast rising property taxes, which was coupled with legislative
inaction concerning the issue. Once passed, Proposition 13 caused city revenues to fall
by $6 billion dollars almost over night (Chapman 1998). To account for this, cities had to
look for new revenues such as sales taxes from commercial and oﬃce space.
Cities also turned to Tax Increment Financing (TIF) via redevelopment projects as a
way to make up for lost revenue, as these projects sought to bring in high tax paying land
uses at the expense of housing (Chapman 1998). Furthermore, as property values
continued to rise homeowners were disincentivized to sell their homes, which caused a
‘lock-in eﬀect’ that served to limit housing supply, lengthen tenure, and delay younger
renters from buying a home (Picker 2005). As Chapman (1998) describes, another major
talking point for the passage of Proposition 13 was that tax savings given to homeowners
were supposed to be passed on to renters by landlords. However, this did not occur,
prompting rent control revolts across California.
To cope with the rising dissent in San Francisco, in 1980 new Mayor Dianne
Feinstein called for a 60-day rent freeze in the city (Rubin 1998). While this was intended
to be temporary solution, this rent control was subsequently strengthened and remains in
place today. Although rent control insulated renters living in buildings constructed before
1979 from quickly rising rents, it also incentivised them not to move. This was especially
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hard on newcomers since it limited the overall supply of rental units and forced new
arrivals into newly built, high-rent units, creating a bifurcated rental market.
Despite these larger, looming issues, victories were won by tenant and resident
organizations over the course of the decade. Aside from rent control these included: antispeculation measures; the preservation of residential hotel units; limitations on
condominium conversion; preservation of downtown residential neighborhoods; the
development of ‘special needs housing’; anti-discrimination housing laws; and the
integration of aﬀordable housing into new mixed-use neighborhoods (Rosen and Sullivan
2014: 127).
However, pro-growth agendas returned to the City in the 1980s, as previously
publicly funded demolition was replaced by privately funded projects. As Calvin Welch
(1996) recounts, from 1980 to 1995 a total of 2,326 units were demolished, with the
majority of demolitions (2,000 units) undertaken by the private sector. Roughly half (1,033)
of these units were single family homes and duplexes that were replaced by
condominiums, while an additional 657 were residential hotel rooms (Welch 1996). As
Welch (1996) reminds, “[t]he key fact to keep in mind when addressing residential
demolition is that the newly built units are always less aﬀordable than the ones
demolished”. According to Welch (1996), the construction and conversions of
condominiums in this period had significant impacts on the overall availability of rental
units in the city and resulted in higher rents and housing prices.
At the federal level, the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) saw the
implementation of neoliberal economic policies coupled with tax cuts that
disproportionately impacted social services. For example, his administration cut overall
federal assistance to local governments by 60%, which included cutting the budget of
public housing and Section 8 vouchers by 50% and eliminating the anti-poverty
Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG), which was used in San
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Francisco for the acquisition and rehabilitation of aﬀordable housing and to support nonprofits and community-based organizations (Drierer 2011; Rosen and Sullivan 2014). As
John Baranski (2019) describes in his book, Housing the City by the Bay, in San Francisco
the privatization and defunding of federal public housing in the 1980s left the SFHA with
little money to repair its dilapidated housing stock and forced it to ultimately move away
from the construction of such housing altogether.
When looking at the creation of homelessness in San Francisco, Randy Shaw
(1996) believes the reduction of available subsidized housing and rapidly increasing rents
and home values were the root cause. According to Shaw (1996), as the gap between
incomes and housing costs widened, very low-income residents were left with no public
alternatives, creating rising homelessness. Additionally, as mental health systems steadily
declined, board-and-care homes were converted into rental housing or market-rate
condominiums while public housing in disrepair was demolished (Shaw 1996). In an
attempt to deal with the issue of rising homelessness Mayor Diane Feinstein spent
millions of dollars on a ‘hotline hotel’ program, which actually took SROs that had served
as permanent housing and turned them into sites for transient occupancy use,
exacerbating the issue (Shaw 1996).
Although Feinstein’s pro-growth approach to downtown development fostered the
continued and heavy transformation of SOMA via the completion of the Moscone
Convention Center and the addition of high-rise oﬃces and high-rent apartments, her
mayorship also saw increasing pushback from neighborhood groups and progressive
politicians, especially against ‘oﬃce creep’ that limited housing supply (Rubin 1998). In
1986, voters passed the highly contentious Proposition M, which was designed to limit
the rapid rate of oﬃce development. As Richard Deleon (1992: 38, 54) highlights in his
book Left Coast City, from 1965-1985 oﬃce production averaged 1.7 million feet per year
as oﬃce vacancy rates averaged 15% per year and 18% for Class A. With housing being
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demolished downtown for the construction of new oﬃce space as part of the SF Planning
Department’s Downtown Plan, Proposition M capped the amount of oﬃce development
that could be approved each year and created a competitive process among developers
seeking to construct oﬃce projects (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 140).
This unprecedented measure gave community groups and housing advocates
leverage in land use and housing decisions in the City. As stated by Deleon (1992: 82),
Proposition M was “not merely a change in the system but a change of the system”, and
this change paved the way for more progressive approaches to housing policy in the late
1980s and early 1990s that aimed to combat the prevailing political pro-growth agenda.
Yet, while Deleon (1992: 135) was quick to declare the “pro-growth” regime had “fallen to
pieces” by the early 1990s, the following decade would see political change and urban
development on a new scale that would have substantial impacts on housing aﬀordability.

3.3 The Nineties to Now: Crisis Complete
While home values in San Francisco rose steadily over the 1980s, the early 1990s brought
a mild housing recession to the city that was experienced nationwide, but enhanced by
the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco. In fact, from 1990-1995 San
Francisco home price appreciation dropped 11% (Lazier 2020). Over this same period
very little market rate housing was constructed overall, and in 1994 aﬀordable housing
units financed by the public sector comprised 63% (776 units) of all housing constructed
that year (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 147). Local funding for rental housing and
homeownership was also cut at this time according to the Mayor's Oﬃce of Housing
Annual Performance Reports, with funding for rental assistance dropping from over $15
million in 1992 to $3.8 million in 1995, and funding for homeownership assistance going
from $1.8 million to $487,000 over the same period (Welch 1996).
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To address the loss and damage of an estimated 6,300 rental and aﬀordable units
due to the Loma Prieta earthquake in the downtown area (Comerio 1997), the largest
development project in San Francisco’s history was approved by the Board of
Supervisors in 1991. This was mixed use project was to be constructed on a 303-acre
parcel that housed former
railroad yards in Mission Bay
(Rosen and Sullivan 2014:
144) (Fig. 7). However, due to
the the economic conditions
at the time, the developer
(Catellus) had to back out of
the initial agreement, which
was intended to be privately
funded (Demhof 2011). In
1995 a new plan was devised,
and under Mayor Willie
B ro w n , t h e p ro j e c t w a s

Figure 7: Plan of Mission Bay Redevelopment Project (from
SPUR: http://www.designforwalkability.com/casesix).

redesigned to include a “43acre University of California, San Francisco medical campus; 6000 housing units, 1700 of
which would be permanently aﬀordable; 5 million square feet of commercial space; and
43 acres of public space” (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 144).
This new project was put under the jurisdiction of the SFRA and funded by Tax
Increment Financing (TIF), which allowed the taxes from the new construction to be used
to fund the project itself, rather than enter city coﬀers. According to Demhoﬀ (2011), this
was actually a boon to housing activists that seized on the TIF funding to demand the
high numbers of aﬀordable housing units included. While this was seen as win for
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aﬀordable housing advocates at the time it has taken several decades to complete the
project. According to a report from OCII, as of April 2019, a total of 5,789 housing units,
including 1,191 aﬀordable units had been constructed with another 725 aﬀordable units in
the pipeline.18
The election of Mayor Brown and the beginning of the dot.com boom in 1995 also
triggered a new era of development that would significantly alter San Francisco’s housing
and planning landscape. According to Demhoﬀ (2011), Brown’s eight years in oﬃce were
a ‘hey-day’ for landlords and developers in the city. Indeed, as Quintin Mecke (2004)
describes in his article ‘McFrisco’, “Brown ‘McDonaldized’ the City Planning Department
into the Department of Development Facilitation, ensuring that the process of approving
high-end, unaﬀordable developments was simplified to a mere formality”.
As hundreds of new startups in San Francisco and the greater Bay Area brought
thousands of new employees into the City its population rapidly increased during the
1990s and new housing solutions were needed to accommodate this influx. To
accomplish this a zoning loophole was used to quickly convert old warehouses to ‘live/
work’ spaces, primarily in SOMA. These builds were not identified as housing by the city,
allowing developers to skirt various fees and school taxes (Demhoﬀ 2011). As discussed
by Mecke (2004), these projects were streamlined under the Planning Department at the
time, and from 1997 to 2001 over 2,500 live-work units were approved throughout the
City, with the majority in neighborhoods such as SOMA, the Mission, and Potrero Hill. As
stated by Mecke (2004), “not one proposed live-work project was ever rejected, a record
so frighteningly perfect that to this day it can make any sane planner still working for the
Planning Department cringe when it’s mentioned”.
With more businesses and employees drawn to San Francisco in the late 1990s
housing prices and rents began to rise dramatically. Although housing construction

18

www.sfocii.org
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increased with 3,400 units approved in 1999, this was not enough to keep pace with
intensely growing demand that saw a ratio of 6.5 jobs added for every one new home
(Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 147). Between 1994 and 2000 the average rent for a twobedroom apartment increased 115% while the average cost of a three-bedroom home
rose 70% (ibid). As new, higher income workers began to move from SOMA to the
Mission, pressure was put on these longstanding communities and evictions began to
increase (Demhoﬀ 2011).
In fact, from 1994 to 1999 the number of evictions in the city tripled while the
number of applicants for new aﬀordable housing units exceeded production by a factor of
ten to one (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 147). As such, it was clear that San Francisco had
oﬃcially entered into a housing crisis, prompting Mayor Brown to lament in his 1999 State
of the City address that nothing threatens the diversity of the city more than a lack of
decent aﬀordable housing (ibid) (see Fig. 8).

Figure 8: An anti-eviction demonstration outside city Hall in 1999
(Photo by Chris Carlsson; from Mecke 2004).

Despite this diﬃcult period in San Francisco’s housing history, there were also
some wins for aﬀordable housing advocates and programs in the later 1990s. For
example, in 1996 the Council of Community Housing Organizations (CCHO) was
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successful in getting Proposition A on the ballot, which was a $100 million bond for
aﬀordable housing (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 146). This proposition passed with a twothirds ‘yes’ vote and increased property taxes to subsidize the construction of lowincome rental housing and provide loans for down payments to moderate income
households that would be paid back and used for other initiatives (ibid). In total, this
helped create 2,125 aﬀordable rental units and 249 loans to first-time homebuyers (ibid).
The following year, in 1997, San Francisco created a Housing Preservation Program to
preserve federally funded aﬀordable units from becoming market rate housing due to a
policy change at the federal level. While over 100,000 units of federally assisted
aﬀordable housing where lost nation-wide, San Francisco did not lose a single unit thanks
to this program (Rosen and Sullivan 2014: 145-6).
As the so-called ‘dot.com bubble’ burst in 2000-2001 it took some pressure oﬀ the
San Francisco housing market, but not much, since from 1993 to 2000 residential rents in

Figure 9: Chart showing San Francisco Bay Area home price appreciation
from 1987-2019. NB: ‘dotcom crash’, ‘market peak’, ‘foreclosure crisis’, ‘Bay
Area high tech boom’ (from compass.com).
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San Francisco had already risen 300% (Demhoﬀ 2011). In fact, home prices only dropped
6% in 2001, and from 2002 to 2006 they jumped back up by 72% in the Bay Area overall
(Lazier 2020; Figure 9, above).
In 2000 the new Giants Major League Baseball stadium (now known as Oracle
Park) opened to great fan-fare and the price of housing quickly rose in the surrounding
Mission Bay area (Demhoﬀ 2011). This was followed in 2004 by the construction of
multiple large residential towers in Rincon Hill that were streamlined by Mayor Gavin
Newsom and the Board of Supervisors after San Francisco had successfully secured a
bid to become the next biotech headquarters when California voters passed a stem cell
research initiative that provided $3 billion over 10 years (Shaw 2005; Demhoﬀ 2011).
According to Shaw (2005), these 40-60 story buildings with units selling for $1 million
each were designed for high earning biotech workers and foreign investors to use as
second homes. This area is also home to the site of the 1,070 ft Salesforce tower, which
broke ground in 2013 and was completed in 2018. In Demhoﬀ’s (2011) opinion, the goal
of developers was to raise land values and rents in the area in an eﬀort to bring new,
higher income inhabitants into the neighborhood while forcing lower income residents
out.
In 2002 the city adopted its Inclusionary Aﬀordable Housing Ordinance, which
allowed it to capitalize, somewhat, on this residential growth. This program provided
developers an incentive to construct inclusionary housing in buildings of 10+ units rather
than pay an in lieu fee (BLA 2012). The units constructed were reserved for those making
between 50% and 120% of the San Francisco Area Median Income. According to a 2012
BLA report, from FY 2002-03 through FY 2009-10, developers contributed to the
construction of 1,204 units of below market rate housing, with 87% of these being
constructed as part of master building projects and 13% via in lieu fees.
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Overall, 1,440 aﬀordable housing units were developed due to the City’s
Inclusionary Aﬀordable Housing Ordinance, which represented approximately 18% of the
8,081 aﬀordable housing units financed by the Mayor’s Oﬃce of Housing or the SFRA
between 2002 and 2010 (BLA 2012: 46). However, in 2010 a Fee Deferral Program was
created that allowed developers to defer 80-85% of aﬀordable housing fees, resulting in
the preference for payment of in lieu fees and less overall aﬀordable housing construction
(BLA 2012: 45). Today (2022), the City requires a minimum of 21.5% of units to be below
market rate for projects greater than 25 units.19
While housing prices in San Francisco and the Bay Area rose steadily until reaching
a market peak in 2006 (see Fig. 9, above), the 2008 financial market crash and
consequent foreclosure crisis saw prices drop by over 40% in San Francisco by 2009
(Figure 9). However, this was not spread evenly across socio-economic sectors as prices
for lower-end homes in the Bay Area dropped by 60%, while higher-end homes only saw
a 15% decrease (Lazier 2020). In general, lower income residents were hit harder by this
crisis as they often had sub-prime mortgages and, in many cases, lost their homes to
foreclosure. The financial crisis also led to a severe lack of housing construction in San
Francisco that lasted several years. While 3,366 new units were added in 2009 only 752
units were authorized for construction (Housing Inventory 2020: 19). In 2010, only 1,082
units were constructed and in 2011 this number dropped to an historic low of 348 new
units with only 269 net units added (Ibid).
Although the impacts of the 2008 recession where felt for several years, San
Francisco’s construction and housing markets began to bounce back faster than the rest
of the country (Karlinsky 2013). Despite the very low number of units added in 2011,
spending on new construction, both public and private, actually exceeded the ten year
average by a billion dollars, coming in at $3.4 billion, beating the 2005 peak (Commerce &

19

https://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/forms/Inclusionary_Aﬀordable_Housing_Aﬃdavit.pdf
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Industry Inventory 2012). In 2012, a total of 32,120 new residential units were approved
by the Planning Department, yet half of these were represented by large-scale projects at
Park Merced, Treasure Island, and Bayview/Hunters Point that will not be completed for
several decades (Metcalf and Walburg 2012; Housing Pipeline Report 2012). Regardless,
in 2012, more than 4,200 residential units were under construction in San Francisco, and
while the total number of new units completed that year was only 794, this number
jumped to 2,330 in 2013 and 3,454 new units in 2014 (Metcalf and Walburg 2012;
Housing Inventory 2020: 19).
From October 2012 to October 2013, rents also increased citywide by 17%, which
was more than any other Bay Area county (Karlinsky 2013). This was largely driven by
increasing demand, as the growing technology sector added 13,000 new jobs in San
Francisco between 2010 and 2012 (Metcalf and Walburg 2012 n. 12). In 2013, San
Francisco was the fastest-growing county in the United States for private sector
employment, beating out both Austin and Houston and adding almost twice as many tech
jobs as Santa Clara County and about 20% more than San Mateo County (Karlinsky 2013
n. 3). This rapid increase in job creation added more pressure to an already constrained
housing supply, and while much of the country and the world was still experiencing an
economic recession, San Francisco’s rents and housing prices were increasing, with the
average home price going up by 21.9% between 2009 and 2013 (Metcalf and Walburg
2012; BLA 2013).
With higher home prices and rents drawing in more investment to a chronically
undersupplied, ‘core’ residential market, evictions also began to rise again (Metcalf and
Walburg 2012; BLA 2013). According to a 2013 BLA report, “there were 162 Ellis Act
evictions for the twelve month period ending September 2013, an increase of 145.5
percent from the 66 Ellis Act evictions for the prior twelve months”. In their report, the
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BLA also found a strong correlation between ‘no-fault’ evictions, such as Ellis Act and
Owner Move-In (OMI) evictions, and rising rents and property values from 2001 to 2013.
Although San Francisco added 30,822 net residential units from 2011 to 2020 for
an average of 3,082 per year, which doubled the average of c. 1,500 units per year from
1993 to 2012, housing supply in the city has remained constrained and both rents and
home prices have risen significantly (Metcalf and Walburg 2012; Housing Inventory 2020:
17). As both city population and job creation continued to grow at a rapid pace, the
production of housing stock in San Francisco did not keep up. According to a 2019 BLA
report (BLA 2019), between 2010 and 2018 job growth far outpaced housing production
with 8.5 new jobs added for every new housing unit produced. Furthermore, while San
Francisco produced 20,711 net new residential units from 2017 to 2021, only 5,253 (25%)
of these were aﬀordable (Housing Inventory 2021: 26). This is despite the fact that San
Francisco is adding similar amounts of both high wage and low wage jobs (BLA 2019).
However, these more recent trends will be explored in greater detail in the following
section.
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4. Data Analysis
4.1 San Francisco’s Housing Stock: Current Data and Recent Trends
Every year the San Francisco Planning Department conducts an annual survey of housing
production trends known as the Housing Inventory. This report records changes in the
City’s housing stock, including housing construction, demolition, and alterations. It has
been published regularly since 1967 and examines both market rate and aﬀordable
housing production in detail. As such, these reports provide a good basis for evaluating
the housing production goals and policies of the Housing Element that San Francisco is
required to submit to the HCD.
The most recent report available is the 2021 Housing Inventory, published by the
Planning Department in April 2022. To examine recent housing trends in San Francisco,
data from this report and the 2020 Housing Inventory will be used alongside other city
reports including the San Francisco Housing Needs and Trends Report (July 2018), the
San Francisco Housing Aﬀordability Strategies reports (2020), drafts of San Francisco’s
Housing Element (January-March 2022), the most recent Housing Balance Reports (April
2021 and 2022), and an Aﬀordable Housing Funding report presented to the Board of
Supervisors in May 2022. Data from several San Francisco Budget and Legislative
Analyst (BLA) reports are also reviewed here.
As can be seen in Figure 10 (below), San Francisco’s 2021 housing stock is divided
into several categories by building type. Of the total 407,020 units in San Francisco, the
majority (31%) of these units are in buildings of 20+ units, which is just barely ahead of
single family homes for the next largest percentage of the city’s housing stock (30%). In
total, 70% of the City’s housing stock is in multifamily/multi-unit buildings.
Roughly 65% of San Francisco’s housing stock is comprised of rentals while 35%
is owner occupied (Housing Needs and Trends Report 2018: 4). When looking at the
entire nine-county Bay Area, this trend flips to 45% renter occupied and 55% owner
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Figure 10: Chart showing San Francisco’s housing stock by building type as of 2021
(from San Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).

occupied (ibid). Rent control in San Francisco covers all rental units in buildings with a
certificate of occupancy dating to before June 13, 1979, but does not cover single-family
homes. At the end of 2021, roughly 175,000 of the City’s rental units were rent controlled,
representing about 66% of all rental units (Housing Balance Report 2021: 14). However,
once a unit is vacated, landlords can increase the rent to market rate in a process known
as ‘vacancy de-control’.
About 80% of San Francisco’s total housing stock was built before 1980, and the
construction of single family homes has dwindled substantially since this time while the
construction of buildings with 20+ units has increased significantly (see Figure 11, below).
In fact, in 2021 these buildings edged out single-family homes for the largest overall share
of San Francisco’s housing stock for the first time ever (see Figure 10, above). Overall, the
construction of apartment buildings with higher densities has increased over the last
several decades, as 92% of new housing units built from 2011 to 2021 have been in
buildings with 20 or more units - a total of 32,321 out of 35,055 new units added (Housing
Inventory 2021: 17).
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Figure 11: Graph showing San Francisco housing stock by type of building and year built
as of 2015 (from San Francisco Housing Needs and Trends Report 2018).

In 2021, San Francisco produced at net total of 4,633 units, up from 4,043 in 2020 and
33.2% above the ten-year average of 3,478 units (Housing Inventory 2021: 5-6). Following
recent trends, 89% of the units built in 2021 (4,142 units) were in buildings with 20+ units
(Figure 12). Although single family homes represent 30% of San Francisco’s total housing
stock, they only represented 0.4% of new net housing units built in 2021 and have
essentially halted in construction (Figure 12). This means that over 99% of new housing in
San Francisco is in multi-family buildings.

Figure 12: Image showing net housing units added in San
Francisco by building type in 2021 (from San Francisco
Housing Inventory 2021).
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The reasons for this are primarily financial as rising costs region-wide have outpaced the
rate of growth in rents, which has prevented production (Housing Aﬀordability Strategies
2020a: 30). Under current market conditions the construction of taller high-rises (more
than 20 stories), generally in or near Downtown (Tiers 1 and 2), are more financially
feasible than other building types since these buildings can generate revenues that oﬀset
the cost of development (Figure 13). However, the further away from the Downtown area
(Tiers 3 and 4), the less financially feasible it is for developers to build.

Figure 13: Image illustrating typical pro-forma developer return by building type
and submarket. Tier 1 - Downtown Core; Tier 2 - Inner-Ring Neighborhoods; Tier 3
- Outer-Ring Neighborhoods; Tier 4 - Western and Southern Neighborhoods (from
San Francisco Housing Aﬀordability Strategies 2020).

4.1.2 Location Trends
The construction of new housing units in 2021 was primarily concentrated in the Mission
(1,182), Downtown (1,155), and the South of Market (1,080) Planning Districts, as can be
seen in Figure 14. In 2021, the Eastside of the City (South of Market plus Downtown)
represented 48% of net new housing added, while the Mission district represented
25.5%. As such, the rest of the Planning Districts in the City produced a combined total
of 26.5% of the net housing added in 2021, which is up from 15.4% in 2020 (Housing
Inventory 2020: 41; Housing Inventory 2021: 41).
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Figure 14: New units completed and new units demolished by planning district
in San Francisco in 2021. NB: Downtown, Mission, and South of Market (from
San Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).

Overall, the east side has far outpaced the rest of the city in residential growth over the
last decade. In 2010, the South of Market Planning District ranked 11th out of fifteen
Districts in total unit count with 22,061, which represented about 6% of all units in the city
(Housing Inventory 2020: 42-45). However, from 2011 to 2020 this Planning District saw
the biggest jump in production with 15,514 units added. This was 10,535 more units than
any other Planning District in this ten-year span. Of the 30,822 units added to the City
from 2011 to 2020, 50% were in the South of Market Planning District (Housing Inventory
2020: 42-45).
The Planning Districts which added the least housing over this ten-year period
were Bernal Heights (64), The Inner and Outer Sunset (119 and 126), South Central (291),
Central (359), and Richmond (477) (Housing Inventory 2020: 42-45). The lack of new
housing in these zones is largely attributable to a combination of strict zoning laws that
do not currently allow for more than 3-unit buildings, and a saturation of single family
homes built in earlier periods. Although the Northeast and Richmond Planning Districts
contain the most total units, these Districts only added 144 units (Northeast) and 2 units
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(Richmond), respectively, in 2021. Given current trends it appears that the South of
Market will soon surpass both the Northeast and the Richmond as the Planning District
with the most residential units in the City (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: Housing stock by building type in each planning district in 2021. NB:
Quantity of buildings with 20+ units in Downtown (04) and South of Market (09) (from

In 2021, the two densest Planning Districts were also Downtown and South of
Market. In the Downtown Planning District 87% of all housing is in buildings with 20+
units (29,834 units), while 78% of units in the South of Market District are in buildings with
20+ units (29,394 units - more than double the 14,070 total from 2010) (Housing Inventory
2021: 42; Figure 15). Combined these two Planning Districts contain nearly half of the
City’s high-density housing.
The Planning Districts with the highest number of single-family homes were South
Central, Outer Sunset, and Ingleside (Figure 15, above). Together these areas accounted
for approximately 46% of all single-family homes. These Districts were also several of the
worst performing when it came to the addition of housing units. For example, South
Central only added 291 net units in this ten-year span while the Inner Sunset added 119
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and the Outer Sunset added 126. The larger Districts of Richmond and Ingleside added
477 and 570 units, respectively (Housing Inventory 2020: 42-45). However, the worst
performing District in terms of housing production was Bernal Heights, which accounted
for only 64 units added in ten years (Housing Inventory 2020: 44).
The data presented above matches well with trends observed over the past ten
years in San Francisco’s most recent Housing Balance Report (April 2022). This report
covers the period between January 1st, 2012 through December 31st, 2021 and breaks
down housing data by Board of Supervisors’ District rather than Planning District. As can
be seen in Figure 16 (below), District 6, which contains part of the South of Market
Planning District, has produced 19,058 net new units over the last ten years. However, in
Districts 1, 4, and 7, which comprise the majority of the westside of the City, a combined
total of 1,276 units were produced in this same period, with only 189 new net units added
in District 4 over the last ten years. This data reiterates that the majority of new housing
has been built on the east side of the city, with the westside failing to contribute in a
significant way.

Figure 16: Table showing Cumulative housing balance over ten-year period from 2012 to 2021
by Board of Supervisors district. NB: Total new units and net new aﬀordable units built (from San
Francisco Housing Balance Report 2021).
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4.2 Population, Jobs, Housing, and Incomes
According to the California Employment Development Department, from 2010 to 2018
total jobs in San Francisco rose from 550,300 to 760,300, an increase of 210,000, or
27.6%. During the same time, the number of housing units added in San Francisco only
increased by 6.5% (24,671 units). Between 2010 and 2018 job growth far outpaced
housing production with 8.5 new jobs for each new housing unit produced. According to
a 2019 BLA report that evaluated the current and planned housing stock in San
Francisco, in 2010 there were 468 housing units produced for every 1,000 residents, but
in 2018 this number had fallen to 311.8 housing units for every 1,000 new residents,
indicating a reduction in housing production relative to population (see Figure 17).

Figure 17: Chart showing San Francisco population growth compared to
housing units produced from 2010 to 2019 (from BLA 2022a).

The failure to produce enough housing to accommodate a growing population has placed
upward pressure on rents and housing prices in the city making it increasingly
unaﬀordable (BLA 2019: 3). In January 2010 the median sale price for homes in San
Francisco was $703,000, but by January 2019 it was $1.3 million, while rent listings for a
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two-bedroom apartment increased from $3,300 to $4,500 between 2010 and 2019 (BLA
2019: 13, Table 6). Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, these numbers
have dipped slightly as the city’s population has declined. According to census data from
July 2020 to July 2021 San Francisco lost 54,813 residents, a 6.3% decline in population,
which was the largest percentage drop in the nation and the lowest San Francisco’s
population has been since 2010 (Li and Neilson 2022). Despite this change, housing
prices and rents in the City still remain unaﬀordable for large portions of the population.
For example, in 2022 the median price for a condominium is $1.2 million, which is
aﬀordable to households making $222,000 per year - a salary earned by less than 25% of
San Francisco households and less than 10% of individual workers (Housing Element
Update 2022b: 5). Rent for a 2-bedroom apartment in 2022 is $3,800 per month (down
from $4,500 in 2019), but this is only aﬀordable for a household earning $137,000 per
year, a figure made by less than 40% of San Francisco households (ibid).
Although overall job growth in San Francisco has been concentrated in both highwage and low-wage industries, housing production has overwhelmingly been
concentrated on market rate (high income) housing. For example, during the current
RHNA cycle (2015-2023) San Francisco has produced 151% of the required ‘above
moderate’ income housing while only producing 42% and 53% of the targets for ‘very
low’ and ‘low’ income households, respectively - a total of 5,046 units for both categories
combined (Housing Element Update 2022b: 6). This magnifies a longer term trend in
housing production, as from 2010 to 2021 only 25% of all housing produced in the city
has been aﬀordable to ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income households (BLA 2019; Housing
Inventory 2021: 26).
As higher income households have occupied a growing share of the city’s housing
of all types, a growing portion of the city’s rent controlled housing has also been taken by
higher income earners. For example, between 2010 and 2017 the median low-wage
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household spent 42.8% of their gross income on rent, which increased slightly to 44.3%
in 2017 (BLA 2019). However, high-wage households only spent 16% of their income for
rent in 2010 and remained at this rate in 2017, staying flat. According to the BLA report
this could be traced to rent control, which prevents some households (in this case, high
income) from experiencing the rent burden that they would if they were paying market
rate (BLA 2019: 14).
Looking at the change in number of households by household income, from 1990
to 2015 San Francisco added over 60,000 households with incomes above 200% AMI
and lost around 40,000 household making between 30-120% AMI (HAS 2020) (Figure 18).
There has been an especially big decrease in the number of lower income households
(<80% AMI) living in the City, which went from 44% of the total households in 2010 to
31% in 2018 (-23%) (Figure 19). Moderate-income households also decreased from 16%
to 13% of the total households in this period. The largest increase came in high-income
households, which rose from 41% of the total population in 2010 to 55% in 2017 (see fig).
As can be seen from Figures 18 and 19, San Francisco is predominately populated by

Figure 18: Image showing change in number of households by income group in San
Francisco from 1990 to 2015 (from San Francisco Housing and Aﬀordability Strategies
2020).
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high income and low-income households, with fewer moderate income households and
jobs.

Figure 19: Image showing changes in households by wage level in San
Francisco from 2010 to 2017. NB: Change in high-wage earners and low-wage
earners (from BLA 2019).

According to the California Employment Development Department, the number of jobs in
the San Francisco area is projected to increase by 126,950, or 11%, between 2016 and
2026. Of this, high-wage jobs are projected to increase by 14%, the highest rate of all
jobs categories. Yet low-wage jobs are also projected to increase by 11%, nearly keeping
pace with high wage jobs. Following these trends, it was projected that San Francisco will

Figure 20: Table showing projected jobs and projected housing needs by wage
level in San Francisco by 2026 (from BLA 2019).
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need to add 34,664 housing units from 2019 to 2026 to match the anticipated
employment growth. Of these, a projected 17,255 units will need to be for low-income
households while 14,022 units are designated for high income households, as ‘high wage’
housing has already been built at a skewed ratio (see Figure 20, above).

4.3 Aﬀordable Housing in San Francisco: Current Data and Recent Trends

4.3.1 Defining Aﬀordability
In general, aﬀordable housing refers to housing where the rent or cost of ownership is
equal to 30% or less of household income. This term can also be used to refer to housing
that is subsidized by the government and/or rented or sold at prices below market rate.
Such housing is generally restricted to households with ‘very low’ to ‘moderate’ incomes.
There are several diﬀerent aﬀordability categories that are defined by income level in
relation to the local Area Median Income (AMI). These categories are determined by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the San
Francisco HUD Metro Fair Market Rent Area (HMFA), which includes San Francisco,
Marin, and San Mateo counties (Housing Inventory 2020: 32). The categories are as
follows20:
•

Moderate Income: 80%-120% AMI

•

Low Income: 50%-80% AMI

•

Very Low Income: 30%-50% AMI

•

Extremely Low Income: below 30% AMI

Each year the Area Median Income (AMI) changes, but in 2020 San Francisco’s median
income was $89,650 for an individual and $128,100 for a family of four.21 It is worth noting
20

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/aﬀordable-housing-as-public-asset

21

See n. 18
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that the AMI used by HUD diﬀers from that used by the California Tax Credit Allocation
Committee (TCAC) and San Francisco’s Mayor’s Oﬃce of Housing and Community
Development (MOHCD). Because MOHCD uses an “unadjusted” AMI with an upward
high cost adjuster, the real incomes that correspond to MOHCD’s AMI levels are lower
than those for the same AMI levels published by HUD and TCAC.22

4.3.2 New Affordable Housing Production
As of 2018, San Francisco had about 33,000 permanently affordable housing units that
were built using a combination of federal, state, and local funding (Housing Needs and
Trends 2018: 18; Housing Affordability Strategies 2020a: 7). In San Francisco the
construction of new affordable housing units is accomplished via three main sources:
inclusionary units, units in 100% affordable projects, and affordable ADUs. From 2006 to
2018 two thirds of new affordable units built in San Francisco were in 100% affordable
buildings (5,664 units), while one third was represented by inclusionary units (2,761)
(Housing Affordability Strategies 2020b: 9). The perseveration of affordable units is
typically undertaken through MOHCD’s Small Sites Program and the Rental Assistance
Demonstration (RAD) program. From 2016 to 2021 these programs preserved a combined
total of 4,201 affordable units (Housing Inventory 2021: 39).
While the source of production and the income bracket for which the housing is
produced varies from year to year the overall percentage of net new affordable housing
produced over the last ten years (2012-2021) has been 24.3% of all new units constructed
(Housing Balance Report 2021: 5). Looking at more recent data from the Planning
Department’s 2021 Housing Inventory, a total of 715 new affordable housing units were
produced in 2020, which was only 15% of the gross units added that year. Of these, 486
were inclusionary housing units, which made up 68% of the total.
22

See n. 18
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However, in 2021 there was a major uptick in affordable units added overall with
1,495 (Figure 21). This is more than double the previous year and 42% higher than the five
year average of 1,051 affordable units built (Housing Inventory 2021: 35-36). The majority
of the units constructed in 2021 were in 100% affordable projects (855 units or 57%), while
355 units (23%) were inclusionary (Figure 21). From 2017 to 2021 the total number of
units produced in 100% affordable projects have been relatively even with the total number
of inclusionary units produced (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Table showing new aﬀordable housing production by source over five-year period
from 2017 to 2021 (from San Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).

In 2020, ‘low’ income units
represented 56% of the new
affordable units constructed while
‘moderate' income units made up
44% of the new affordable units.
Yet, this changed in 2021 when a
third of the new units built (567)
were for ‘very-low’ income
households, which was well over
a third of the total units added
and the most units of any

Figure 22: New aﬀordable housing constructed by
income in level in San Francisco in 2021 (from San
Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).
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affordable income bracket (Figure 22). This was followed by ‘low’ income at 528 units
(35%) and moderate income with 387 units (25%).
The majority of affordable housing has been, and continues to be, built in San
Francisco’s eastern Planning Districts, such as the South of Market, Mission, Western
Addition, and South Bayshore (see Figure 23). Looking at the ten-year data (2012-2021)
from the City’s Housing Balance Report (2022), the Planning District with the highest
number of affordable units added was South of Market with 2,849, which represented 17%
of the new net units produced in that District (16,595 total). This is likely because most
new market-rate development has occurred in the South of Market, meaning the majority
of inclusionary units are also located there.

Figure 23: Map showing location of aﬀordable housing units in San Francisco by type and
number of units per building as of 2018 (from San Francisco Housing Aﬀordability
Strategies 2020).
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The second highest number of affordable units built over the last ten years were
located in Downtown, with 1,336 units, and the third was South Bayshore with 1,300 units.
The South Bayshore Planning District also had the highest percentage of affordable units
added in respect to its overall new net units at 76% (see Figure 24). In this period South of
Market added the most units (1,059) for the ‘very low-income’ category, followed by South
Bayshore with 854 units. The most ‘low-income’ units were also added in South of Market,
as these 1,351 units are more than any other Planning District by far. The lowest number
of affordable units added in the last ten years was in Bernal Heights (5 units), followed by
the Marina (36 units) and the Outer Sunset (37 units). Overall, 8,472 of the 34,899 net new
units added from 2012 to 2021 were affordable, which accounts for 24.3% (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Table showing aﬀordable housing production by aﬀordability level and by planning
district from 2012 to 2021 (from San Francisco Housing Balance Report 2021).

4.3.3 Affordable Housing Rehabilitation and Acquisitions
The acquisition and/or rehabilitation of affordable units for ‘low' and ‘very low’ income
individuals typically involves non-profit housing organizations purchasing existing
residential buildings via funding from the Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community
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Development (MOHCD) and the Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure (OCII)
(Housing Inventory 2021: 39). Purchasing and rehabilitating older residential buildings or
hotels is often much cheaper and faster than building entirely new units (ibid). This
approach also allows for apartment buildings serving lower income renters to be removed
from the speculative market and preserves existing affordable housing stock built in prior
decades (Housing Affordability Strategies 2020a: 12). Many of the rehabbed units are in
residential hotels, known as SROs (single room occupancy units), but some are also larger
family apartments, converted commercial or industrial buildings, and homes for residential
care providers (Housing Inventory 2021: 39). It is necessary to note that preserved
affordable units are not included as part of the yearly new units reported in San
Francisco’s Housing Inventory as the Planning Department only counts newly created
units and not preserved units (ibid).
Overall, MOHCD oversees an extensive portfolio of over 25,000 units in buildings it
has funded as well as those formerly overseen by the San Francisco Housing Authority
and former Redevelopment Agency (Housing Affordability Strategies 2020a: 45). MOHCD
has several programs to create and preserve affordable housing in San Francisco. These
include 100% affordable multifamily housing, HOPE SF, down payment assistance loans,
Small Sites, Preservation and Seismic Safety, and the monitoring of inclusionary units.
Over the last five years MOHCD and
OCII reported the acquisition or
rehabilitation of 758 units (Housing
Inventory 2021: 39). In this period the
highest number of units preserved
was in 2020 with 405, while the lowest
number was in 2021, with only four
units preserved (Figure 25).

Figure 25: Table showing units acquired or
rehabilitated in San Francisco from 2017 to 2021
(from San Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).
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The Small Sites Program (SSP), created in 2014, provides permanent financing to
convert multifamily rental buildings serving ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income renters with 5 to 25
units to permanently affordable housing. Since 2014 the City has preserved the
affordability of 563 units across 53 properties through this program (Housing Inventory
2021: 39). In 2020, total development costs for SSP were approximately $497,000 per
unit, but the City's local funding contribution was high at $339,000 per unit, or 80% of total
development cost (Housing Affordability Strategies 2020a: 73).
In 2022 the cost per unit was
revised to c. $450,000 in 2022 and the
city’s contribution went down to 68%
with the remainder covered by
l o a n s . 23 A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s n o
dedicated funding source for SSP, the

Figure 26: Cost breakdown of MOHCD ‘Small Sites’
aﬀordable unit. Blue represents city funding, green
resents funding acquired via loans (from BOS GAO
May 19, 2022 Report).

City has used existing funding
sources such as in-lieu fees, affordable housing bonds, and the Housing Trust Fund
(Housing Affordability Strategies 2020b: 23). Funding from Proposition I, which passed in
November of 2020, totalling $64 million was also earmarked for the Small Sites Program
as budget supplemental by the Board of Supervisors in November of 2021, but the Mayor
has indicated she will not spend these funds on the program, despite the 8-3 ‘veto-proof’
vote (Schneider 2021: Redmond 2021). Since these funds are in the General Fund, rather
than a dedicated fund, the Mayor has control over their ultimate direction during budget
negotiations.
The City’s affordable housing is also preserved and rehabilitated through the Rental
Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program and HOPE SF. Since 2016, a total of 3,443
units of public housing have been transferred to local developer teams for rehabilitation

https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=10905702&GUID=037E15BE-0136-4350AEA7-717766EF1472
23
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and long-term operation via the RAD program, which is sponsored by the federal
government and the department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). However, the
last transfers to occur were in 2018 (Inventory 2021: 39). Combined, RAD and HOPE SF
have allowed for over 4,000 units of public housing to be rehabilitated and transferred to
nonprofit ownership in recent years. The remaining 1,500+ public housing units, located in
Potrero and Sunnydale, will be rebuilt through the locally funded HOPE SF program or
converted to the Section 8 platform.24 The cost per unit is estimated to be $399,235 given
the extensive nature of the work that needs to be carried out on these sites (Housing
Affordability Strategies 2020b: 22). In addition, the current lack of federal funding for the
maintenance of these sites makes their ongoing deterioration an additional challenge.

4.4. Funding Affordable Housing in San Francisco
Because affordable housing projects produce lower revenues due to lower rents and sale
prices they need to be subsidized in various ways to offset the cost of development or
rehabilitation. In San Francisco, this subsidization has primarily been funded by local,
state, and federal sources. However, these sources have changed significantly over the
past twenty years due to shifts in policy and priorities at different levels of government.
Before 2012 the federal government and the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
(SFRA) financed the majority of affordable housing construction and preservation in the
City. Prior to the dissolution of the SFRA, their Tax Increment Financing (TIF) had been the
largest and most stable source of local funding for affordable housing development. From
2002 to 2011, the SFRA was responsible for funding 45% of the 12,083 units produced in
this period, with a specific focus on family, senior, and supportive housing (see Figure 28,
below). Since 2012 the City has been able to find a number of new funding schemes and
sources for affordable housing construction, but none are as stable as the TIF funding

24

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/renewal-projects
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previously provided. While San Francisco has been able to add 7,542 new affordable units
from 2011 to 2020, this is significantly less than the 12,083 units produced in the prior
decade and far short of the RHNA goals for the impending eight year cycle.

4.4.1 Funding Affordable Housing Before 2012: The SFRA
From 2002 until 2011 aﬀordable housing in San Francisco was primarily produced by
three sectors: (1) nonprofit housing developers funded in part by the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) and the Mayor’s Oﬃce of Housing (MOH now MOHCD);
(2) the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA); and (3) market-rate developers via the
inclusionary housing program or the jobs-housing linkage program (BLA 2012).
As can be seen in Figure 27 (below), from FY 2002-2003 to FY 2010-2011 a total of
$1.9 billion was spent on aﬀordable housing in the city. Federal funding was the largest
source of financing for aﬀordable housing projects in San Francisco with the majority
coming from Federal tax credits ($634 million), or Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
(LIHTC). These credits are awarded to developers by the government through a

Figure 27: Table showing city, state and federal financing of aﬀordable housing
projects in San Francisco from 2002 to 2011 (from BLA 2012).
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competitive process and are often sold to private investors to obtain funding. Once the
projects are complete, investors can claim tax credits in annual allotments over a period
of 10 years.
The second largest source of financing came from the City, with the majority of
funds being generated by tax increment financing (TIF) revenues and bond proceeds
($460 million). Tax increment revenues typically come from the diversion of future property
tax revenue increases within a redevelopment area and are used for the construction of
publicly funded projects, such as aﬀordable housing. As such, the San Fransisco
Redevelopment Agency was responsible for generating the tax increment revenue seen in
Figure 27. However, given the chequered past of the SFRA and many other
redevelopment agencies in California, all such agencies in the state were dissolved at the
end of 2011 by order of the California Supreme Court.
The elimination of the SFRA was indeed significant due to its eﬀect on funding for
aﬀordable housing production in San Francisco. Up until 2012, Tax Increment Financing
had been the largest and most stable source of local funding for aﬀordable housing
development. Although State law only required that 20% of tax increment funds needed
to be allocated for the development of low and moderate income housing, the SFRA
allocated approximately 40% of its tax increment funding annually - the highest of all
California redevelopment agencies (BLA 2012: 61). Looking at Figure 28 (below), we can
see that from FY 2002-03 to FY 2010-11 the SFRA was responsible for developing 3,966
units for ‘very low' income households, which was 42% of the total produced. As can be
seen, the SFRA also financed 1,520 units of ‘low’ to ‘moderate’ income housing, which
was 55% of that total. Of the 12,083 units produced in this period, the SFRA was
responsible for 45% and had a specific focus on family, senior, and supportive housing.
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Figure 28: Table showing development of aﬀordable housing units by agency from
2002 to 2011 (prior to the dissolution of SFRA) (from BLA 2012).

As public financing for aﬀordable housing decreased overall from FY 2007-08 to FY
2010-11, the SFRA with its TIF revenues was able to increase its funding by 20% over
this time to make up for some of the shortfall (see Figure 29). The dissolution of the SFRA
in 2012 lost the City an average of $46 million a year in revenues as well as the ability to
issue tax increment bonds from ‘Project Areas’ outside ‘Major Approved Development
Projects’ that were transferred to SFRA's successor agency, the Oﬃce of Community
Investment and Infrastructure (OCII) for completion. These ‘Major Approved Development
Projects’ include the Mission Bay North and South Redevelopment Project Areas (Mission
Bay), the Hunters Point Shipyard Redevelopment Project Area and Zone 1 of the Bayview

Figure 29: Table showing decrease in public funding for aﬀordable housing
projects in San Francisco from 2007 to 2011 (from BLA 2012).
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Redevelopment Project Area (Shipyard/Candlestick Point), and the Transbay
Redevelopment Project Area (Transbay).25

4.4.2 Funding Aﬀordable Housing in San Francisco after 2012: New Approaches
The loss of SFRA funding forced the city to look for other methods to finance aﬀordable
housing projects, including the sale of General Obligation bonds (G.O. bonds), property
taxes, hotel taxes, developer fees, and other local sources. In fact, since 2012, San
Francisco has passed a number of key initiatives to increase resources for aﬀordable
housing production. These include (Housing Aﬀordability Strategies 2020b: 8):26
•

2012: Housing Trust Fund as a set-aside within the City’s General Fund capped at
$50 million per year for 30 years for a total of $1.2 billion (Proposition C)

•

2015: $310 million affordable housing General Obligation (G.O.) bond (Proposition
A)

•

2016: Significant increase to the inclusionary obligations on market rate housing

•

2016: Preservation and Seismic Safety Program, or PASS, repurposing of a $260
million bond for acquisition and conversion of housing to permanently affordable
(Proposition C)

•

2018: Gross receipts tax to fund housing and services for people experiencing
homelessness - expected to create $300 million per year for supportive housing
(Proposition C)

•

2019: $600 million affordable housing G.O. bond (Proposition A)

•

2019: Ordinance approved by Board of Supervisors allowing use of excess
Education Revenue Augmentation Fund (ERAF) for affordable housing

25

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/enhancement-projects-production

26

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/sources
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•

2020: Health and Recovery G.O. Bond included $147 million for permanent
supportive housing

•

2020: Increase to transfer tax via Proposition I for properties valued over $10
million for the General Fund that is subject to annual appropriation (for FY 20-21,
$10 million of supplemental appropriation was approved for affordable housing).

In addition to the sources above, San Francisco has several other routes to obtain funding
for the production of affordable housing including fees, debt sale, state grants and loans,
and federal sources. One such fee used by the city is the Jobs-Housing Linkage Fee,
which applies to projects that increase commercial spaces by 25,000+ gross square feet.
As of 2021, the Jobs-Housing Linkage Fee for office development was $72.04 per square
foot for projects over 50,000 square feet and $64.83 for projects under 50,000 square
feet.27
The Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program also has a fee component if the
developer chooses not to provide the required amount of affordable units. While these
allocations have changed over time, currently for a building with 10-24 rental units, 14.5%
of the units ‘on-site’ need to be affordable, while for a building of 25+ rental units, 21.5%
need to be affordable.28 For an ‘off-site’ build, the percentages rise to 20% affordable for
10-24 units and 30% affordable for 25+ units. If these criteria are not met, developers must
pay an in-lieu Affordable Housing Fee of $210.47 per applicable square foot.
From 2003 to 2019 the City collected over $440 million through in-lieu fees, and in
2020, a total of almost $15 million was collected as partial payments of in-lieu fees for
projects.29 Yet, from 2017 to 2021 inclusionary fees and impact fees have dwindled

27

https://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/documents/admin/Impact_Fee_Schedule_2021_notification.pdf

28

https://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/forms/Inclusionary_Aﬀordable_Housing_Aﬃdavit.pdf

29

https://default.sfplanning.org/projects/community-stabilization/inclusionary-housing.htm
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significantly, going from over $107 million to just $4.3 million per year in this five year span
(Figure 30). Since these
fees

are

tied

to

construction starts, they
are not a reliable source of
revenue, especially in
construction downturns.
For example, over half of
the funds obtained in this

Figure 30: Inclusionary and Impact fees collects by the city of
San Francisco from 2017 to 2021 (from BOS GAO Report May
19, 2022).

period were derived from
one year (2017).
As outlined above, the sale of debt has also been a frequently used method to
obtain more funding for affordable housing. Most recently, San Francisco issued a $600
million G.O. bond for affordable housing production and preservation in 2019. The revenue
produced form these debt sales was designed to fund several types of affordable housing
including public housing, low-Income housing, affordable housing preservation, middleIncome housing, senior housing, and educator housing.30 However, as of December 2021,
less than half of the $252 million raised from the first issuance was expended or
encumbered, and a balance of $151 million remained to be allocated (Figure 31, below).
In addition to G.O. bonds, the sale of Certificates of Participation (COPs) is another
General Fund debt tool used to support the rehabilitation of San Francisco’s public
housing stock via HOPE SF. In addition, MOHCD’s Preservation and Seismic Safety
(PASS) Program also sells below market debt to fund acquisition and preservation
projects, which reduces the need for direct capital subsidy. Finally, OCII, the successor to

https://cgoboc.sfgov.org/models/data/28Feb2022/docs/
CGOBOC%202019%20Housing%20Bond%20Report%20123121.pdf
30
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Figure 31: Graph showing first bond issuance expenditures from 2019 citywide
aﬀordable housing bond as of December 2021 (from CGOBOC Report 2021).

SFRA, has been allowed to continue tax increment financing (TIF) on the grandfathered
Major Approved Development Projects mentioned above.
Incentive-based programs, such as density bonuses, are also used to increase
funding for affordable housing. San Francisco has its own local density bonus program for
mixed-income projects in specific geographic areas and zoning districts known as HOME
SF. According to the San Francisco Planning Department, “[E]ligible projects that are
exempted from density limits, may seek zoning modifications from a pre-determined list,
and may be eligible for additional height. HOME SF projects must provide at least (1)
between 20% and 30% of the units as affordable units for ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income
households, and (2) 40% of the units in the building with at least two-bedrooms.” 31

31

https://sfplanning.org/home-sf
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Other bonuses which have the potential to spur affordable housing development in
San Francisco are provided by the State. These include both Analyzed and Individually
Requested Density Bonuses which allow for a 35% density bonus depending on the
amount of affordable housing provided and the level of affordability. According to the
Planning Department’s 2020 Housing Inventory, as of December 2020, 17 projects were in
the pipeline for the HOME-SF Density Bonus Program while 60 projects were in the
pipeline for the State Density Bonus Program. These density bonus projects propose
adding 920 units (HOME SF) and 6,577 units (State Density Bonus) to the City’s housing
stock.
The State also provides assistance to San Francisco through grants and loans via
the Affordable Housing Sustainable Communities (AHSC) program, the Multifamily
Housing Program (MHP), and the Infill Infrastructure Grant Program (IIG). As these are
state-wide programs funding is limited and awarded competitively, which often leads too
minimal investments. For example, the maximum AHSC Program loan or grant award is
$30 million for any project, and while San Francisco received the the IGG’s maximum
award for the Balboa Reservoir project, this totalled just $26 million.32 Although the MHF
provides favorable 55-year loans with a 3% interest rate for affordable housing production,
only 30% of the funds available are earmarked for northern California as a whole.33
Over the last two decades federal funding for affordable housing, which includes
Section 8, HOME, and CDBG (among others), has been flat or in decline (Housing
Affordability Strategies 2020b: 5). Currently, Federal Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8)
subsidize the rent of 9,500 San Francisco households, but are limited by a lack of funding
(Housing Affordability Strategies 2020b: 4). Other federal funding sources such as Private

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/aﬀordable-housing-and-sustainable-communities; https://www.hcd.ca.gov/infillinfrastructure-grant
32

33

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/multifamily-housing
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Activity Bonds (PAB) are also competitively awarded and subject to caps, which makes
them less reliable year over year. However, one-time federal gifts from pandemic related
stimulus packages, such as the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), have been a vicarious
boon for San Francisco. In February 2022, the State awarded San Francisco $200 million
in funding from the Housing Accelerator Fund which was seeded by $1.75 billion of ARPA
funding.34 In the coming year this money will be used to build over 400 units of affordable
housing for families, formerly homeless individuals, public housing residents, and
transitional aged youth in San Francisco.
Despite the decline in overall federal funding, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program, which is a federal incentive-based program responsible for funding the
majority of affordable housing in the US, is still a major contributor to affordable housing
production in the City. As can be seen in Figure 32, based on a review of recent projects
that received tax credit funding and had entered into ground lease agreements with
MOHCD, the total development cost for an affordable housing unit in San Francisco was
estimated at $693,000 in 2019. While City funding accounted for 37% of the total required

Figure 32: Funding stack for a sample of rent aﬀordable housing projects in San
Francisco that have entered into a ground lease agreement with MOHCD (from
Housing and Aﬀordability Strategies 2020).

34

https://sfmayor.org/article/san-francisco-secures-over-200-million-state-funding-aﬀordable-housing
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($257,000), federal funding, primarily in the form of LIHTC, remained the largest source for
such projects at 41%.
Also of note is the fact that the State is only currently contributing 7% of the funding
for such projects. This is an area where funding could increase considerably given recent
budget surpluses and stimuli provided by the federal government at the state level.
Providing additional state funding to cities to help them meet state-mandated affordable
housing allocations would certainly be practical use of these windfalls and one-time
sources. Finally, as the Bay Area Housing Finance Authority (BAHFA)35 gets off the ground
in the coming year(s), securing additional funding at the regional level will also be
necessary for San Francisco to have a chance of meeting its housing goals. Indeed, for
San Francisco to meet its RHNA target of 5,825 affordable units per year, all of the existing
contributions will need to be considerably augmented.

4.5 RHNA Allocations and Production in San Francisco
4.5.1 Examining Feasibility via the 5th and 6th Cycles: Progress and Projections
For the current, 5th RHNA cycle spanning 2015-2022, San Francisco was tasked with
producing 28,869 units of housing. According to San Francisco’s Housing Element Draft,
at the of the end 2021, a total of 26,861 of the 28,869 RHNA allocated units had been
authorized for construction; however, the vast majority of these (18,968 units) were
market-rate units, representing 151% of the requirement for ‘above moderate’ income
housing (Housing Element Update 2022a: 6) (see Figures 33 and 36). During the current
cycle, housing production has lagged for ‘very low’ to ‘moderate’ income households (i.e.
aﬀordable housing) as the San Francisco has has only facilitated the construction of 42%
of its allocation for ‘very low income’ groups (2,601 units) and 53% of its ‘low income’

35

https://mtc.ca.gov/about-mtc/authorities/bay-area-housing-financing-authority-bahfa
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Figure 33: Progress summary for San Francisco’s RHNA goals for the 5th cycle (2015-2022)
as of 2021 (from San Francisco Housing Element Draft 2022).

allocation (2,445 units) (Housing Inventory 2021: 15; see also, Housing Element Update
2022a: 6; Figures 33 and 36).
Slightly more current data from the 2021 Housing Inventory, shows that in actuality
22,220 units of market-rate housing were completed in this timeframe, which is even
more than the 18,826 units authorized (Figure 34). Although San Francisco has technically
exceeded its RHNA requirements via competed units with 29,011 (of the required 28,869),
those units authorized or completed that are in excess of the allocated amount for ‘above
moderate’ income category are not counted towards the RHNA goals. As such, San
Francisco currently has a RHNA deficit of 8,298 units, all of which are in the aﬀordable
categories. When looking at the data for completed aﬀordable units this deficit is even
higher at 9,542 units. As can be seen, San Francisco has struggled to produce half of its
RHNA aﬀordable housing goals for the current cycle, but has overproduced significantly
in the market-rate category.
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Figure 34: Progress summary of San Francisco’s RHNA goals over the 5th cycle (2015-2022)
as of 2021 according to the San Francisco Planning Department’s Housing Inventory 2021
(from San Francisco Housing Inventory 2021).

Looking to the the 6th cycle, on December 16, 2021, the ABAG Executive Board
adopted the Final RHNA Plan for the San Francisco Bay Area. This plan will require the
cities and counties of the Bay Area to add 441,176 new housing units between 2023 and
2030, which is 2.5 times higher than the previous cycle’s allocation of 187,990 homes. The
big jump in allocated units for the upcoming 6th RHNA cycle is due to several new and
altered laws at the state level (see Section 1 and Section 5.4).
For the nine-county Bay Area,
25% of new homes must be for ‘very
low’ income households, 15% for ‘low’
income, 17% for ‘moderate’ income,
and 43% for ‘above moderate’
income.36 Following the adoption of
the regional plan, each local Bay Area
government is required to update its
Housing Element to demonstrate to
HCD it can accommodate its allocated
housing. In many cases, this will
require cities to make changes to their
36

Figure 35: Map showing RHNA allocations fo the
upcoming 6th cycle (2023-2030) (from MTC).

https://abag.ca.gov/our-work/housing/rhna-regional-housing-needs-allocation
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existing zoning laws to allow for the new mandated construction.
Over the 6th RHNA cycle (2023-2031) San Francisco has been allocated 82,069
units of housing to meet its mandated goals. This substantial increase is 53,200 more
units than the allocation from the previous RHNA cycle. The 82,069 units required make
up 18.6% of the total allocation for all nine Bay Area counties and represent the largest
allocation for any city in the Bay Area, with San Jose second at 62,200 units allotted (see
Figure 35, above). For perspective, over the last ten years a total of 34,899 units have
been produced in San Francisco, and over the last twenty years there have been a total of
55,726 units added (Housing Inventory 2021: 19; Housing Balance Report 2021). This 20year production total is 26,343 units less than the RHNA allocation for the next eight year
cycle (2023-2030).
Of the 82,069 allocated units, 46,598 units will need to be aﬀordable to ‘very low’
to ‘moderate’ income residents (Figure 36). The majority of these units will need to be for
the ‘very low’ income category as 20,867 units have been assigned to this bracket. This is

Figure 36: Graph illustrating progress towards San Francisco’s RHNA goals for the 5th cycle
(blue) compared to the allocations for the upcoming 6th cycle (orange) (from BOS GAO Report
May19, 2022).
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more than triple the previous cycle’s allocation of 6,234 units (Figure 36). It is worth noting
that as of 2021 only 2,618 units were completed for ‘very low’’ income residents over the
current cycle, which would represent only 12.5% of the goal for the 6th RHNA cycle. As
new aﬀordable housing production in San Francisco has averaged 847 units per year over
the last ten years, at the current pace it will take the City about 55 years to reach its
aﬀordable housing allocations for the next eight year RHNA cycle.

4.5.2 Funding San Francisco’s Affordable Housing Goals: Projections and Shortfalls
Finding the necessary funding to build the affordable units allocated by RHNA will also be
a difficult task for the City. To begin, in March 2020 the San Francisco Planning
Department published a Housing Affordability Strategies report designed to improve
housing affordability over the next 30 years, especially for ‘low’ to ‘moderate’ income
residents. In this report the Planning Department analyzed development feasibility, city
policies, and public investments needed to achieve a housing target of 5,000 new housing
units per year with at least
one third (1,670 units)
permanently affordable in
addition to preserving another
1,100 units each year through
rehabilitation and conversion
(Figure 37). For perspective,
these numbers represent
about half of what is required
for the 6th RHNA cycle (i.e.

Figure 37: Investment breakdown of funding needed to
achieve San Francisco’s Housing Aﬀordability Strategies’
goals of 5,000 new units and 1,100 preserved units per year
(from San Francisco Housing Aﬀordability Strategies 2020).

about 10,000 units per year).
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As seen in Figure 37, to surpass the goal of 1,667 units the City would be
responsible for paying for 1,030 new affordable units per year, while private development
needs to account for 640 new inclusionary units. However, in 2020 the City was only able
to produce a small fraction of the required units for 100% affordable buildings, with 52
units, and was only able to reach less than half of its target for preserved/rehabilitated
units with 405 units. In 2021 these trends flipped as the City produced 855 units in 100%
affordable buildings, close to its goal of 1,030 units, but only produced four units of
preserved/rehabilitated housing of the 1,100 unit target. According to the Housing
Affordability Strategies (2020a: 41) report, the City needed to spend over $517 million of
public funds per year to meet its own affordable housing production and preservation
targets (Figure 38). While San Francisco was almost able to achieve this lofty goal in
2019-2020 after a period of increasing investment in affordable housing, from 2006 to
2018 San Francisco fell far short of this goal (Housing Affordability Strategies 2020a: 41)
(Figure 38). Although funding for
2022 and 2023 is estimated to be
upwards of $300 million each year,
after this point it is expected to drop
significantly without additional
sources (ibid).
Looking at the new RHNA
goals more specifically, according to
San Francisco’s ten-year Capital
Plan which was updated in 2022,
for the City to meet its projected
production targets for ‘very low’,

Figure 38: Graph showing aﬀordable housing funding
by time period in San Francisco relative to estimated
need for production of 5,000 new aﬀordable units and
1,100 preserved units (from San Francisco Housing
Aﬀordability Strategies 2020).

‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income
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housing over the 2023-2031 RHNA cycle, it was estimated that approximately $7 billion
would be needed, or $875 million per year.37 In addition, the estimated cost to acquire and
preserve 400 affordable units annually was set at approximately $1.9 billion through
2031.38 However, in the Capital Plan, the total budget for affordable housing (both
production and rehabilitation) over the next ten year period was set at $3.16 billion with a
shortfall of $547 million predicted, meaning that the actual spend over this time would be
$2.62 billion total - over $6 billion short of the estimated $8.9 billion that is needed to meet
the RNHA allocations and the City’s own preservation targets.39
Additionally, a new report provided to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors by
the Planning Department in May 2022 has shown that these shortfalls are even larger than
previously estimated.40 In this report the local funding gap for affordable housing
construction in the first year of the new RHNA cycle alone is estimated to be $1.3 billion
(Figure 39). This gap is then predicted to increase each year until 2029 with a total

Figure 39: Graph showing estimated local funding gaps for the required aﬀordable
housing production in San Francisco for the 6th RHNA cycle (2023-2030) (from BOS GAO
report May 19, 2022).
37

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/enhancement-projects-production

38

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/renewal-program-preservation

39

https://onesanfrancisco.org/the-plan-2022/financial-summary

https://sfgov.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=5548608&GUID=2164CC59-4861-4729BCE0-4F5939845CB7
40
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predicted local shortfall of $14 billion over this seven year period (Figure 39). So, not only
will San Francisco need to facilitate the construction of 46,598 affordable units in eight
years, it will also need to spend over $19 billion to do it (see Redmond 2022a).

4.5.3 The Housing Element: RHNA Site Inventory and the Rezoning Program
Building the necessary housing to meet San Francisco’s RHNA goals is made harder by
the fact that sites identified for development do not often get built as planned. According
to a recent study out of UCLA, in a sample of 97 California cities, sites included in the
2014 Housing Element inventory (for the 5th cycle) had, on average, around a 10%
chance of being developed within the planning period (Kapur et al. 2021). This trend was
also true for the nine-county Bay Area as a whole, where inventory sites had a 10%
chance of getting developed over the period of study (ibid). In this same period about
70% of housing produced in San Francisco, and the greater Bay Area, was located on
non-RHNA inventory sites (Kapur et al. 2021).
In San Francisco, the probability that a RHNA inventory site would be developed
over the cycle was between 7.3% and 9.7%, depending on the dataset (see Figure 40).

Figure 40: Table comparing data from ABAG and city-sourced permits showing probability
of development on Housing Element inventory sites from the 5th RHNA cycle. NB: San
Francisco ‘P(dev) over 8 years’ and ‘Share of units built on housing element sites’ (from
Kapur et al. 2021).
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The share of actual units built on inventory sites in San Francisco was between 29-33%
of all units built, meaning that 71-67% of the units constructed during the cycle were on
non-inventory sites, on par with the rest of the Bay Area.
As the authors point out, the fact that most housing construction occurs on non
housing element sites: “casts considerable doubt on a central premise of the RHNA/
Housing Element framework, namely, that the way to get cities to accommodate their fair
share of regionally needed housing is to make them identify and zone specific sites which
are ‘good candidates’ for development” (Kapur et al. 2021). Because the provision of an
inventory of suitable sites to accommodate the RHNA allocations is an essential piece of
the Housing Element that is used to judge feasibility of production goals, for the 6th cycle
a 15% capacity buﬀer has been added to account for the lack of development on
inventory sites (Housing Element Update 2022b: 6; Figure 41).
As discussed previously, the actual production totals are not the only data that is
sent to the HCD. In addition, the Planning Department also reports entitled units, or those
that have been permitted by the Planning Commission that are likely to be completed
within the current RHNA cycle. These units are at various stages of construction and the
Planning Department acknowledges that not all filed building permits will necessarily turn
into constructed housing units since project plans and financing can change after a
building permit is filed. However, to fulfil the RHNA requirements, the City needs to show
the HCD that it has the capacity to authorize and build its allotted units.
Currently, the San Francisco Planning Department’s Draft Sites Inventory estimates
there is capacity for just under 72,000 units, which falls short of the target capacity (with
the 15% buﬀer) by 22,500 units (Housing Element Update 2022b: 16). As can be seen in
Figure 41 (below), the greatest shortfall is in sites for lower income brackets (i.e. ‘low’ and
‘very low’ income), while the production of market rate units is expected to exceed the
allocated target. Looking at the hard target of 82,069 units, the City is projected to be
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Figure 41: Draft summary of San Francisco’s inventory sites for the 6th RHNA
cycle. NB: Projected capacity deficits (from Housing Element Draft 2022)

short about 10,000 units for the lower income bracket and 6,500 for the moderate income
bracket; however, San Francisco is expected to surpass its market-rate construction
goals by about 6,300 units.
Because of the overall estimated shortfall, all indications are that the City will need
to rezone to accommodate its RHNA targets. However, this expected Rezoning Program
will not be submitted to the HCD as part of the Housing Element, but will instead be a
later legislative action completed within three years of the Housing Element’s adoption,
per State requirements (Housing Element Update 2022b: 20). According to the City, this
time is necessary “to perform community outreach, further analysis, and refinement of
development controls to meet metrics” (Housing Element Update 2022b: 25).
The Rezoning Program is designed to supply the units that are currently lacking by
providing more capacity to accommodate 22,000 additional units. To accomplish this, the
Rezoning Program intends to remove long-standing density limits on the westside of the
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City, and particularly in what is known as
‘Well-resourced Neighborhoods’, a
geography defined by the State (Housing
Element Update 2022a: 14; Figure 42 and
Figure 43). The zoning changes in these
neighborhoods will entail removing some
or all density limits in certain
Neighborhood Commercial districts and in
all Residential Districts within 800 feet of
transit corridors, as well as increasing
density maximums in RH1, RH2, RH3, and
RM1 zoned areas to four units in areas
outside the 800-foot buﬀer (Housing

Figure 42: Map showing well resources areas
in San Francisco (from Housing Element Draft
2022).

Element Update 2022b: 14).
In addition, increased height limits of up to 55-85 feet along select transit corridors
will also be considered and could be structured as a local density bonus (ibid; Figure 43).
Finally, the City aims to build between 25% and 50% of its new permanently aﬀordable
housing within ‘Well-resourced Neighborhoods’ within the next two RHNA cycles (16
years). Although local rezoning legislation (e.g. Fourplex proposals and “Cars to Casas”),
is currently under consideration by the Board of Supervisors, these pending proposed
rezoning changes are not expected to provide enough units to impact the Site Inventory
and Rezoning Program in a significant way, but are discussed in more detail below (see
Section 5.4).
The Planning Department also acknowledges that rezoning alone will not facilitate
the construction of new housing, especially in the aﬀordable categories, since constraints
such as high land value, high construction costs, permitting uncertainty, and community
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resistance also play important roles in limiting production. As such, the 2022 Housing
Element also proposes changes to city regulations (Housing Element Update 2022b:
26-27). These include reducing the length of the city permitting process and streamlining
the review of projects; supporting the use of cheaper construction materials; and creating
a dedicated and consistent local funding stream in addition to advocating for state and
federal funding to support the construction of permanently aﬀordable housing.

Figure 43: Maps showing areas in San Francisco considered for rezoning for additional
height and/or density. Purple - removing density limits within 800 feet around SFMTA 5minute network and lines 33, 43, and 44; hashed - increasing height between 55-85 feet
around a select group of transit routes; light purple - allowing fourplexes within areas that fall
outside of the buﬀers in high resource areas (from Housing Element Draft 2022).
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5. Current Crises and Current Debates
5.1 Competing Voices in San Francisco Housing Politics
When it comes to housing politics in San Francisco there are three distinct groups, each
with narratives that influence how the current housing crisis is understood and addressed.
These are: the NIMBYs, the YIMBYs, and the Progressives. The concept of NIMBYism
(“not in my back yard”) dates back to an article by Frieden (1979), and was originally used
by neighborhoods, especially homeowners, to block the siting of “locally undesirable but
socially beneficial facilities” (Richman 2002: 223). Examples of these facilities could
include homeless shelters, airports, prisons, and waste disposal sites (ibid). In San
Francisco, the construction of aﬀordable housing, or, in most cases, any type of housing,
is also a concern for local NIMBYs. NIMBYs are typically homeowners with ‘risk-adverse’
and ‘self-interested’ mentalities that favor strict land use regulations due to their desire to
protect their major asset - their home (Shively 2007: 257).
Research has shown that NIMBYs are “typically older, more highly educated,
wealthier, more likely to organize and attend meetings, and very certain of their opposition
to the proposed facility” (Shively 2007: 257). This has proved to be the case in San
Francisco where neighborhood groups have become fluid in the planning system and
understand how it can be used to delay or kill building projects. Because many NIMBYs
are wealthier they tend to have more time and money to fight projects, forcing city
planners to take notice and (at times) concede, even if they are often not representative of
the population as a whole (Richman 2002; Shively 2007). While the NIMBY cohort will
admit that adding housing during a housing crisis is needed, they do not want it near their
‘backyard’ and they will use a number of options to oppose projects they believe would
negatively eﬀect their property or neighborhood value in any way.
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In direct opposition to the NIMBYs is the more recent YIMBY (“yes in my
backyard”) movement, which has gained traction in cites throughout the US over the last
decade with early roots in New York and San Francisco (Beyer 2017). The YIMBY position
is pro-density and their mantra in ‘build, baby, build’ (ibid). They argue that increasing the
supply of housing will create more aﬀordability and cause rents and housing prices to fall.
YIMBYs also associate themselves with environmentalism, clean energy, and alternative
transport and view housing production as a social justice and equity issue (McCormick
2017). While NIMBYs have been active at the local level by inserting themselves in the
planning process, the YIMBYs have looked to the state legislature to eﬀect change by
backing bills that mandate rezoning and promote land use deregulation in an eﬀort to
circumvent local regulations.41 Because YIMBYs are pro-development and pro-growth
they have been criticized for their market-based solutions, which some say promote
gentrification and are akin to ‘trickle down economics’ or libertarianism (McCormick 2017;
Bronstein 2018). Regardless, the YIMBYs have been very successful at fund-raising and
capturing the attention of the national news media, which has helped them gain political
power and influence decisions at the state level (Bronstein 2018).
As San Francisco is also a well-known left-leaning, politically progressive city any
movement that aligns with developers and is pro-capitalism is often met with resistance.
According to the political scientist Richard Deleon (1992), the first priority of San
Francisco’s progressivism “is not revolution but protection - protection of the city’s
environment, architectural heritage, neighborhoods, diversity, and overall quality of life
from the radical transformations of turbulent American capitalism”. Fundamentally, the
progressives believe in the preservation of neighborhoods, diversity, character, and
particular ways of urban life. They stand in contrast to the YIMBYs that want to build it all
and instead only want to build what is ‘right’ - i.e. aﬀordable, non-gentrifying, aligned with

41

e.g. https://yimbyaction.org/2021/; https://cayimby.org
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neighborhood character and ideals. They are the old guard liberals, the empathetic and
inclusionary - both preservationist and anti-capitalist despite the dichotomy this creates
when it comes to housing.
The progressive movement is primarily concerned with how the addition of housing
will aﬀect the whole neighborhood and city, rather than just themselves. For example,
some worry that anything but aﬀordable housing will result in rising rents that bring
displacement and gentrification (e.g. Redmond 2015). The progressives also have
significant power at the local level in San Francisco City Hall, and while their guiding
ideology does not align with that of the NIMBYs their preservationist approach has
resulted in fewer housing projects receiving approval. Mayor London Breed and local
YIMBY leaders have gone so far as to call the predominantly progressive Board of
Supervisors ‘obstructionists’ and ‘anti-housing’ due to their recent decisions on housing
projects, including developments at 469 Stevenson and 450 O’Farrell (Dineen 2021a and
2021b; Moench 2022a).

5.2 The Supply-side and the Supply Skeptics
Traditional economic theory would state that if demand is high and supply is limited,
prices for a good will rise; however, if more supply is provided to meet this demand prices
should fall. Yet, when it come to the housing market in San Francisco, the laws of supply
and demand have been increasingly challenged over the last decade. As Calvin Welch
(2013) states, “[o]f the City’s 47 square miles, only 13 square miles are available for
housing uses… And all 13 miles are developed and owned by somebody. There is no
‘free land’ in San Francisco.” He goes on to argue that supply and demand does not
function in San Francisco because there is no “competitive” market, as land owners
possess all the “market power” since additional land cannot be produced in San
Francisco due to its geographic constraints. While Welch’s statements are largely true,
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they do not mean that more housing cannot be produced on the land that does exist.
Housing supply does continue to increase in constrained markets as it has in San
Francisco, albeit not in a way that has satisfied overall demand.
Because of this, some supply skeptics have argued that all new housing should be
exclusively aﬀordable (or at least 50% aﬀordable) and that the addition of market-rate
housing only serves to drive housing prices higher (e.g. Welch 2013; Redmond 2015;
Durkin 2016). They argue that new market rate development only benefits that highest
income earners and that this added supply will not make housing more aﬀordable for
lower income earners (see, e.g. Been et al. 2018; Redmond 2018; Rodriguez-Pose and
Storper 2019). While this makes sense in theory, given the current aﬀordability crisis that
San Francisco and California are experiencing, this stance fails to account for the
practicalities of aﬀordable housing construction and the cost of further limiting overall
supply.
First, the LIHTC program, which provides federal tax credits to private developers
and investors for the construction of aﬀordable housing is the largest source of aﬀordable
housing in the country and accounts for 41% of the recent funding for aﬀordable housing
projects in San Francisco that have a ground lease with MOHCD. Second, inclusionary
units built by market-rate developers accounted for 39% of all new aﬀordable units built
from 2017 to 2021 (2,048 of 5,253 units) (Housing Inventory 2021: 37). Because of this,
halting market-rate development in San Francisco would have significant adverse eﬀects
on aﬀordable housing production that would need to be counteracted by a substantial
influx of new city revenues, which, as has been shown, are severally lacking.
Although much more aﬀordable housing is needed in San Francisco, in 2019 highwage jobs were projected to increase by 14% by 2026 (the highest rate of all jobs
categories) while low-wage jobs were projected to increase by 11% (BLA 2019). Indeed,
from April 2021 to April 2022 the San Francisco-San Mateo metro area added 26,600 high
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wage jobs in professional, scientific, and technical services.42 Failing to account for
incoming high-wage workers will force the further cannabilization of the city’s rent
protected housing stock, as has been occurring. For example, in 2017 high-wage earners
paid 16% of their salary for rent while low-wage earners paid 44% (see BLA 2019).
According to the BLA, the reason for this was the ability of high-wage earners to avail
themselves of rent controlled apartments.
Rent controlled units have also decreased in recent years going from about
190,000 in 2013 (Welch 2013) to roughly 175,000 in 2021 (Housing Balance Report 2021:
14). If no new market-rate housing stock is added this will create additional downward
pressure on sub-markets, which has resulted in evictions and displacement in the past as
landlords of lower-end, older units tend to force out lower income tenants for those willing
to pay a higher rate (e.g. BLA 2013). While the addition of more market-rate housing may
not directly translate to lower rents for low-wage earners, i.e. increased aﬀordability,
restricting market rate supply will cause home prices and rents to soar even higher in
addition to putting heavy pressure on sub-markets where high-wage earners will always
be able to outbid lower-wage earners (Somerville and Mayer 2003; Been et al. 2018).
Finally, any displacement of lower income renters will also create further competition for
new or existing aﬀordable housing units, increasing demand that is already far from being
met. For example, a recent BLA report (see BLA 2022b) shows that over 21,000
households applied to live in the 305 currently vacant inclusionary aﬀordable units in San
Francisco.
According to some scholars, the addition of new market-rate units should also
promote the concept of ‘filtering’, whereby older, less expensive housing stock filters
down to lower income households as high earners move on to the newly provided units
(e.g. Arnott and Braid 1997; Rosenthal 2014; Weicher et al. 2016). While filtering has been
42

https://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/file/lfmonth/sanf$pds.pdf
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shown to occur in the United States, it can take time. As research by Weicher, Eggers,
and Moumen (2016) has shown, in 2013, of the 6.6 million non-subsidized, aﬀordable
units studied in the US, 45% had been either owner occupied or classed as high rent
apartments in 1985. However, 19% of these 6.6. million aﬀordable units were higher rent
as recently as 2005 (Weicher et al. 2016). According to the American Housing Survey,
from 2003 to 2013 filtering was responsible for producing more aﬀordable rental units
(renting at under $400 per month) in the US than new constructions or tenure
conversions, and increased the number of overall aﬀordable units by 11% (Joint Center
for Housing Studies for Harvard 2015) (Figure 44).

Figure 44: Graph showing gains and losses of aﬀordable units in America from 2003 to
2013. NB: Gains from filtering (form Joint Center for Housing Studies for Harvard 2015).

Moreover, research by Somerville and Mayer (2003) on 38 metropolitan areas in the
US found that in housing markets where supply is constrained, aﬀordable housing units
are more likely to ‘filter up’ and out of the aﬀordable housing stock category as landlords
are incentivized to upgrade their properties for entry into a higher submarket, causing
permanent losses of aﬀordable units. The authors conclude that restrictions on the supply
of new units also lower the overall supply of aﬀordable units. Looking at the Bay Area
specifically, a report on displacement in low-income neighborhoods between 2000 and
2013 corroborates this conclusion, as it found that market rate housing production was
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associated with reduced displacement, irregardless of inclusionary housing practices in
the Bay Area (Taylor 2016).
It is also feared that the addition of a market rate apartment building will bring
about gentrification by raising rents, displacing residents, and ruining neighorhood
character. While this is a fear that is shared by tenants in San Francisco and beyond (e.g.
Finamore 2014: Atta-Mensah 2017; Hankinson 2017), it is also one that is diﬃcult to
prove empirically. Research by the Upjohn Institute (Asquith et al. 2019), a Michiganbased employment research firm, looked at the eﬀects that the creation of new housing
had on housing prices in large US cities and found that in most cases, rents within 250
meters of new buildings stayed flat or declined three years after a building’s completion.
This was also the case for the one building that was analyzed in San Francisco for this
study.
Looking at San Francisco in more detail, a paper by Pennington (2021) examines
the impacts of new construction on nearby rents, displacement, and gentrification from
2003 to 2017. Based on the data anlayzed for San Francisco, Pennington (2021: 23)
found that rents and displacement actually fell near new market-rate projects, but that
gentrification rose, especially with in 100 m of the new building. This means that as higher
income earners moved into units vacated by lower income earners, those leaving did not
move to lower income zip codes in the City. According to Pennington (2021: 17), the
supply eﬀect is larger than the demand eﬀect, and she concludes that new market-rate
buildings reduce rents within 100 m by $28.03 and reduce the risk of displacement by
17.14%.
These results corroborate research by Asquith, Mast, and Reed (2020) that focuses
on the local eﬀects of large new apartment buildings in low income areas throughout the
US. According to the researchers, the addition of new buildings decreases rents in nearby
units by about 6% relative to units slightly farther away, and increases in-migration from
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low-income areas, which also triggers filtering. They argue that because these new
buildings absorbed many high-income households and increased the local housing stock
overall they actually caused rents to fall in the two-block radius around the new buildings.
Looking outside the US, studies in Finland and Singapore have shown that the addition of
high-rise, multi-family developments have had ‘positive’ impacts on home values in their
near vicinity (Ooi and Le 2013; Kurvinen and Vihola 2016). Yet it is worth noting that the
authors of these papers were pro-development and pro-density, as rising property values
were cited as a benefit to welcoming more residential density.
Although adding new market rate housing may not quickly or directly eﬀect the
rents of lower income households, adding supply does help alleviate the overall housing
shortage. In sum, increasing overall housing supply has been shown to: take downward
pressure oﬀ submarkets and prevent overall displacement; add more aﬀordable units to
the housing stock via inclusionary construction and in lieu fees; promote downward
filtering of older units; and allow for aﬀordable units to be preserved by preventing them
from filtering up and out of aﬀordable zones. That said, market rate housing development
on its own will not and cannot solve the aﬀordability crisis since this will take significant
government investment and coordination at the local, regional, state, and federal level.
However, limiting market rate construction will not create more aﬀordability in any
segment of the housing market either. Therefore, while building more market rate housing
is necessary to meet continued demand and combat the overall housing shortage, it is
not suﬃcient to solve the ongoing aﬀordability crisis (see Manville et al. 2019).

5.3 Up-zoning, De-regulation, and Creating Density
One way to both allow for and encourage more housing construction is to mandate
rezoning to increase density, also known as up-zoning. However, academics, elected
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oﬃcials, and activists are divided over whether up-zoning will actually produce the
intended outcome. Proponents of up-zoning in San Francisco argue that it will allow for
more housing of all types to be constructed and provide much needed supply that will
increase aﬀordability in addition to spreading residential buildings and aﬀordable housing
more equitably across the City. Opponents of up-zoning argue that it will create
speculation and gentrification and erode aﬀordability as market-rate units will be the
dominant form of housing constructed. Both of these arguments contain logic and truth,
which is why the issue of up-zoning is such a nuanced and hotly debated topic.
Today, San Francisco’s strict zoning regulations, which date back to 1978, still
prevent the city from growing vertically in neighborhoods where increased density is
needed since two-thirds of the city is oﬀ-limits to construction of buildings with more than
three units. These restrictive zoning regulations coupled with the arduous nature of the
City’s planning process make it more diﬃcult for housing projects to get approved or built
in a timely manner. Because San Francisco building permits are ‘discretionary’ rather than
‘by-right’ they must first be approved by the Planning Department. In other cities projects
can get approved rather quickly if they match existing zoning restrictions, but in San
Francisco the Planning Department must first review the project before giving the final
‘discretionary’ decision on whether it can move forward or not. Neighbors and
neighborhood groups can also appeal a project for a variety of reasons and even invoke
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to directly challenge a project on a wide
base of potential environmental threats, including the building’s shadow or potential to
create gentrification or displacement. This appeal process can hold up housing projects
for months or years and has been abused in the past by certain community groups and
political factions to halt projects.
However, the issue of regulation is about more than warring neighborhood groups
and political football since it produces significant economic outcomes. Numerous studies
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have shown that highly regulated housing markets correlate with increasing home prices.
In a study of the San Francisco Bay Area, Kok et al. (2014) conclude that “cities that
require a greater number of independent reviews to obtain a building permit or a zoning
change have higher land prices… [and] that local land use regulations are closely linked
to the value of houses sold”. Looking at California more broadly, a study by Jackson
(2016) also found that for each additional land use regulation adopted by a city, permits
fell 6% for multi-family homes and 3% for single-family homes. Finally, in a literature
review on the subject, Gyourko and Molloy (2015: 42) conclude that “[t]he vast majority of
studies have found that locations with more regulation have higher house prices and less
construction.” In sum, multiple studies have shown that such regulations make housing
more expensive to buy and harder to produce.
Given these findings, there has been a growing demand, especially among the
YIMBYs, for de-regulation in San Francisco. This could take many forms, including the
removal of certain planning restrictions to allow for ‘by-right’ development, limiting the
power of the CEQA appeal process, and/or rezoning. Over the past several years the
topic of rezoning and, specifically, up-zoning, has received considerable attention in both
academia and the California/San Francisco housing scene due to its broader application
and contentious nature.
One study that has been frequently discussed was undertaken by MIT doctoral
candidate Yonah Freemark (2019a) and focuses on the outcomes of up-zoning certain
parcels in Chicago, Illinois. This paper studies a series of up-zonings on individual parcels
in Chicago, which occurred in 2013 and 2015 and were tracked over a five year period.
These parcels were then compared to equivalent areas that were not rezoned to
determine the eﬀects of the policy. From this data, Freemark (2019a) found that the upzoned properties saw significant increases in transaction price as well as an increase in
existing condominium price; however, he did not see evidence of any new construction in
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the period of study. As such, Freemark (2019a) concluded that for his study “the shortterm, local-level impacts of up-zoning are higher property prices but no additional new
housing construction”.
These findings were quickly championed by those against up-zoning to claim that
‘higher density’ would lead to higher housing prices. The study was also used as part of
an eﬀort to combat Sen. Weiner’s SB 50, which sought to eliminate single family zoning in
California in an attempt to increase density. However, Freemark (2019b), was quick to
respond with an op-ed to remind that his study had no bearing on the impact of actual
higher density since no construction was observed. He also points out that his study of
Chicago focused on specific rezoned parcels (a spot study) and did not study the eﬀects
of blanket re-zoning as was proposed by SB 50. Finally, he reminds that the parcels that
were up-zoned for denser residential use in Chicago were originally mixed-use and not
previously zoned for single family homes.
Regardless of these diﬀerences, Freemark’s study of Chicago brings up some
concerning issues that are in need of further consideration. Importantly, the Chicago
study shows that the short-term response to up-zoning was increased speculation on
land and increased land value. This was not surprising, according to Freemark (2019b),
since “the city gave landowners the ability to build more on it”. Essentially, this up-zoning
created a ‘gap’ between the parcel’s current function and its potential function - and
value.
In his book Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State, Samuel Stein
(2019) discusses the concept of the ‘rent gap’ and the ‘value gap’, which he says are
exploited by real estate developers resulting in gentrification. According to Stein (2019:
49), “real estate speculators choose to invest in a particular location because they identify
a gap between the rents that land currently oﬀers and the potential future rents it might
command if some action were taken”. According to Stein (2019: 50), once several
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properties in a neighborhood reach their full rent potential, the ‘rent gap’ for other
buildings in the area becomes more apparent.
The ‘value gap’ then appears when incomes generated from rentals become
insignificant compared to the potential value of sale - when this occurs the potential for
gentrification rises (Stein 2109: 50). Finally, Stein (2019: 52) states that the core of
gentrification is primarily the process of “landlords and developers identify[ing] gaps and
act[ing] to close them”. If this is accurate, the concept of up-zoning is worth further
review as it has to power to instantly create rent and value gaps that could be exploited
quickly, as was the case in the Chicago study.
Since land use in cities has been largely fiscalized - i.e. that decisions concerning
land use are driven by fiscal outcomes - zoning has become more of an economic
instrument than ever before. As such, up-zoning should be considered a market-based
solution to the housing crisis that asks the private market to respond to a public need.
However, the private market has consistently shown that it seeks the highest return on
investment, which can lead to gentrification and displacement if guardrails (such as
tenant protections and rental demolition moratoria) are not put in place (see Welch 2013;
Finamore 2014; Section 5.6).
In another academic paper that was promoted by those opposed to zoning
changes in San Francisco, Andres Rodriguez-Pose and Michael Storper (2019) argue
against deregulation and rezoning and instead call for increased government intervention
in the housing market in the form of public subsidies and social housing. Yet, it is worth
noting that up-zoning and increasing government funding for aﬀordable housing are not
mutually exclusive. In this piece Rodriguez-Pose and Storper (2019) conclude that upzoning will do little to make housing more aﬀordable in cities like San Francisco or lead to
domestic migration. They posit that, “aggregate supply policies do essentially nothing to
abate the underlying structural causes of the housing crisis in prosperous metro areas
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that we have identified [which are]: high demand from highly-skill, high-income people;
increasing income inequality; and a rise in construction and land costs” (Rodriguez-Pose
and Storper 2019: 33).
Unfortunately, studies on up-zoning, land use regulation, and gentrification are still
in their relative infancy and often produce varied results depending on their place and
period of study as well as the nature of the data and methodologies used. While
undertaking large-scale zoning changes at the state level could help produce more
housing and increase overall aﬀordability, its wider unintended short and long term eﬀects
remain unknown, which brings inherent risk. As Rodriguez-Pose and Storper (2019) point
out, “[n]one of the extant models or simulations provide realistic estimates of how much
new housing would result from up-zoning in prosperous regions, or the realistic
geographical distributions of such new supply”. However, as Manville, Lens, and
Monkkonen (2019) argue in their response paper to Rodriguez-Pose and Storper (2019),
San Francisco is in need of help, despite the risk rezoning may pose. As they say:
“Surgery is risky; no one should do it if they are perfectly healthy. But most people don’t
consider surgery if nothing is wrong. They consider it when they are very sick. The
consequences of inaction also matter” (their italics).
The unfortunate conundrum here is that a lack of housing supply places downward
pressure on the market which leads to more displacement and a loss of aﬀordable units.
However, up-zoning, which can be used as a tool to increase housing supply, can lead to
the same outcomes via neighborhood gentrification if some form of regulation is not in
place - just like surgery can kill you if proper precautions are not taken.

5.4 Recent Rezoning Legislation in California
Despite the uncertainties surrounding up-zoning, it has been the preferred method that
state lawmakers have sought to use to stimulate housing production in California. In
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particular, a group of state senators spear-headed by Sen. Scott Weiner (D-SF) has
attempted to pass rezoning legislation since 2018 in the form of SB 827 and SB 50, which
both failed. Under SB 827, California cities would have been required to permit residential
buildings from 45 to 55 feet in height within a half-mile of a high-frequency transit stop, or
within a quarter-mile of a bus or transit corridor; minimum parking requirements would
have also been eliminated. This would have aﬀected 96% of land in San Francisco given
the city’s existing transit corridors (Kurura 2018).
While SB 827 was backed by California YIMBY groups, it faced opposition from
NIMBY neighborhood groups, local governments, and the social justice community
(Kukura 2018). Given this blowback, Sen. Weiner amended the bill to allow cities to ban
the demolition of rent-controlled housing, allow displaced tenants to have first choice on
new development, and guarantee that developers have to pay all moving expenses and
rent for displaced tenants (ibid). Regardless of these changes, the bill died in the Senate
Transportation and Housing Committee in April of 2018 in a 6-4 vote (Kim 2018).
The next iteration of this bill was the more widely known and publicized SB 50,
which required similar up-zoning near transit, fourplex zoning statewide, and additional
rezoning in "jobs-rich" areas (Keeling 2019). Again, this bill would have pre-empted local
government control of land zoning in an attempt to spur new housing construction. As
before, this bill was criticized by local governments, social justice and anti-gentrification
activists, and established homeowners. After several attempts to pass the bill it ultimately
died on the state senate floor in January 2020. It is worth noting that both of these bills
would have impacted San Francisco significantly, and it is likely that these bills were also
indirect attempts to specifically increase housing in San Francisco given Weiner’s
experience as a former District Supervisor and his familiarity with the planning and
appeals process as well as the slow pace of housing production.
Although these larger-scale zoning laws were ultimately unsuccessful, the
refinement of the RHNA process via SB 828, which was also authored by Sen. Scott
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Weiner and passed in 2018, is yet another way state legislators are seeking to force
rezoning in cities like San Francisco. As has been discussed, this bill changed the
methodology used to determine each region’s housing allocation for the upcoming 6th
RHNA cycle and forces California cities to re-zone land to account for homes not built
due to under-production from prior RHNA cycles while also zoning more land for
residential properties if a state audit shows there is a shortage in that community. Due to
the increased accountability and enforcement inherent in the new RHNA process, if the
San Francisco fails to produce a complaint Housing Element it could lose access to
essential aﬀordable housing funds as well as authority over its own zoning.43
In addition to these bills, lawmakers in Sacramento were also able to get several
other bills signed into law by Governor Gavin Newsom in September of 2021 that allow
for increased density state-wide. These were SB 9 and SB 10 and they went into eﬀect in
January 2022. The first, SB 9, allows for up to four homes (a duplex and two ADUs) to be
built on parcels previously zoned for single family homes throughout California.
Importantly, SB 9 requires that cities approve projects ministerially (i.e. ‘by-right’), rather
than via discretionary review, and exempts them from the CEQA appeal process. SB 9
also requires that homeowners who choose to develop their lots must live on one of the
parcels for at least three years, in addition to containing other rules to discourage
developers (Collins 2021). However, a study from the Terner Center at UC Berkeley found
that it would only be financially feasible to undertake such projects on about 5% of the
existing single-family parcels in California - or about 410,000 out of more than 7.5 million
single-family lots.44
The second bill, SB 10, allows cities to opt-in to higher density zoning ordinances
and permits up to ten residential units for projects located near transit rich areas and
https://abag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2021-06/Consequences%20of%20NonCompliance%20with%20Housing%20Laws.pdf
43
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https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/SB-9-Brief-July-2021-Final.pdf
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urban infill sites.45 This bill, authored again by Sen. Weiner, essentially oﬀers cities a
choice to take on the up-zoning that SB 50 would have required, all while allowing SB 10
projects to bypass CEQA oversight. The overall goal is add more density to California’s
suburban neighborhoods that have historically been exclusionary for such land uses.

5.5 Pending Legislative Changes in San Francisco: Rezoning and Streamlining
San Francisco is also in the process of legislating its own local zoning changes, and there
are currently several plans in play proposed by diﬀerent city supervisors. The legislation
that has the most traction was written by District 5 Supervisor Rafael Mandelman (cosponsored by Matt Haney) proposes allowing any single-family home to be turned into a
‘fourplex’ while corner lots could be converted to have six units. This legislation passed
unanimously at the San Francisco Planning Commission in November 2021; however, an
amendment was added by the Commission and accepted by Sup. Mandelman that
allows this legislation to circumvent the expedited review process mandated by SB 9
(Gardiner and Morris 2022). The Planning Commission’s recommendation to up-zone all
single-family lots in the city to allow duplexes would exempt it from SB 9 since that law
only applies to single-family zoned parcels. By making all properties duplexes, San
Francisco can negate the SB 9 mandate that requires ministerial rather than discretionary
review. This would then allow for all projects to be subject to the CEQA appeal process
and other discretionary reviews that would slow or halt many of the fourplex projects
encouraged under the original legislation.
Mandelman’s legislation came before the Board of Supervisors’ Land Use
Committee in March 2022 where it was discussed along with competing legislation
authored by Supervisors Gordon Mar (District 4) and Asha Safai (District 11). Of these,

https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/california-governor-newsom-signs-threeimportant-new-bills-into-law-impacting-residential-zoning-and-development.pdf
45
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Supervisor Mar’s fourplex proposal is the most relevant as it would oﬀer a subsidy from
the city for construction costs (of $229,000), require that new units include at least two
bedrooms, and require that the units would be aﬀordable to those making no more than
100% AMI (Redmond 2022b). His rules would also place these two-bedroom units under
rent control at no more than $3,000 per month.
According to Mar, this would target the so-called ‘missing middle’ for which the
city has consistently underperformed (Dineen 2021c). While this legislation could produce
some needed units, expecting current single family home owners to pick up the slack and
create aﬀordable housing at a pace that has a noticeable impact on the shortage of this
stock is probably wishful thinking. Although aspects of Mar’s legislation will likely be
added to Mandelman’s proposal before it is brought before the full Board or put on the
ballot in the next several months, as long as the duplex recommendation from the
Planning Commission (which negates the eﬀects of SB 9) remains intact, this legislation
will be flawed. In fact, initial analysis by the Planning Department predicts that while this
legislation will provide about 5,000 units over the next RHNA cycle, it will also eliminate
the 1,500 units projected to be built via SB 9 (Housing Element Update 2022b: 12). If the
duplex recommendation were removed, it would allow for a projected 6,500 units to be
added to the Sites Inventory and counted towards RHNA goals.
While the pending fourplex proposals would primarily address zoning on the
westside of the City, legislation proposed by Mayor Breed, known as ‘Cars to Casas’,
could add some additional density in the rest of the city as well. This proposed legislation
would eliminate density limits by lot size on parcels with “auto oriented uses,” such as
parking lots, garages, and auto repair, sales or rental shops. While the ‘Cars to Casas’
legislation would also allow for the construction of fourplexes, many of the parcels in
question already overlap with density decontrolled zones and are not located in ‘Wellresourced neighborhoods’ (Housing Element Update 2022b: 25). Overall, the Planning
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Department believes the eﬀect of this legislation, if passed, would be minimal over the
next RHNA cycle (ibid).
In addition, Mayor Breed has also proposed a charter amendment called
‘Aﬀordable Homes Now’ that would streamline the approval process for certain types of
residential development projects and go to the ballot in November 2022 (Dineen 2022b).
The amendment is designed to circumvent the City’s discretionary reviews process,
cutting several years oﬀ approval times, to streamline projects that are: 100% aﬀordable;
catering to teachers; or include 15% more below market rate units than is required under
current city law (ibid). The Executive Director fo YIMBY Action, Laura Foote, has said that
polling shows 60% support among voters and the amendment only requires a majority to
pass (Dineen 2022b). Yet, Fernando Martí, Director of the CCHO, argued that most of the
projects included are already streamlined via SB 35 and Proposition E (2019), and he
reminded that many large-scale housing projects that include aﬀordable units and have
been entitled and approved are yet to be built. He asks whether the problem is with the
approval process or, rather, with investors (ibid).
A group of San Francisco supervisors is also backing a competing proposed
charter amendment to streamline aﬀordable housing that was introduced by Supervisor
Connie Chan in May 2022 known as the ‘Aﬀordable Housing Production Act’. Chan’s
proposal also waives discretionary review for the same three types of projects as Mayor
Breed’s proposal, but requires that projects include at least 30% two-bedroom and 20%
three-bedroom units (Moench 2022b). Chan’s proposal also requires an initial
commitment of 36.5% aﬀordable units, rather than an addition of 15% after approval, a
number Todd David, Executive Director of the Housing Action Coalition (HAC), believes
will make it impossible for developers to aﬀord project construction costs (Moench
2022b). Another key diﬀerence between the proposals is Chan’s requirement for a “skilled
and trained workforce”, which would consist of union labor, and for the mayor’s oﬃce to
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release an annual aﬀordable housing report (ibid). According to Rudy Gonzalez, secretary
treasury for the San Francisco Building and Construction Trades Council, there are
currently 1,300 unemployed union laborers looking for jobs in San Francisco (Moench
2022b).
In addition, Chan’s proposal keeps the standard definition for aﬀordable housing
projects at 120% AMI while Breed’s proposal would allow streamlining for projects at
140% AMI if the Board of Supervisors were to change their definition of aﬀordability in the
future (Moench 2022b). If Chan can get the support of five of her colleagues on the Board
her proposal will appear on the November ballot, while Breed needs 52,000 signatures for
her measure to appear. Breed’s proposal currently has 25,000 signatures (ibid). According
to Chris Elmendorf, a UC Davis law professor, if both proposals reach the ballot it will
create confusion for voters in November. He also believes that Chan’s proposal will
ultimately be infeasible for developers and result in very few projects being streamlined
(Shanks 2022). However, as John Avalos of CCHO argues, market-rate developers should
not be the only entities taking advantage of streamlining measures, and states that Chan’s
proposal has the power to create more aﬀordability, especially via publicly funded
projects (ibid).

5.6 Interview Insights
As discussed in the Methods section (Section 2), six individuals were interviewed for this
project to gain greater insight on the overall housing crisis in San Francisco and the role
the new RHNA process could play for aﬀordable housing production. The data obtained
from these interviews is broken down thematically below and pertinent thoughts and
comments from each interviewee can be found in the individual themed sections. These
are:
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• Funding Aﬀordable Housing Production and Preservation in San Francisco
• Zoning and Land Use Regulation in San Francisco
• Market-Rate Housing and the Real Estate Market
• The RHNA Process and Allocations
• The Role of the State
• One Word and Main Block
The six interviewees are as follows (see Section 2 for bios):
1. Laura Foote - Executive Director of YIMBY Action
2. Sam Moss - Executive Director of Mission Housing Development Corporation
3. Todd David - Executive Director of the Housing Action Coalition (HAC)
4. Oz Erikson - Principal/Chairman of the Emerald Fund
5. Fernando Martí- Co-Director of the Council of Community Housing Organizations
(CCHO)
6. Calvin Welch - Author/Activist/Advisor/Professor

Funding Aﬀordable Housing Production and Preservation in San Francisco

When it comes to the topic of funding aﬀordable housing projects in San Francisco,
Laura Foote notes that “subsidized aﬀordable housing is vulnerable since there are lots
of choke points”. She says that it is easy to stall aﬀordable housing projects with
timelines and deadlines, which forces “projects to shrink the whole way through”. Foote
was also critical of the City’s role, saying that “the city is not helping enough” and that
their long RFP process forces non-profits to “beg for money” even after their proposal
has been accepted, which is “not ideal”. In addition to these issues, Sam Moss reminds
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that non-local funding sources have also dwindled over the last two decades as “HUD
doesn’t help anymore… and we killed redevelopment and lost a lot of aﬀordable housing
money”.
While increasing the number of inclusionary units in new market-rate buildings has
been used as a tactic by elected oﬃcials, Oz Erickson believes that “the idea that the
cost [of producing aﬀordable housing] can be put on market rate development is
unrealistic”. He says, “the cost of construction is the same for market rate and aﬀordable,
there is no diﬀerence really…out of pocket costs are similar and the finishing costs are
small”. Erickson also says that each unit costs about $850,000 to build. According to
Erickson the big costs are the elevator and the structure as well as the raw materials and
labor that “have to be paid for somewhere”. He states that there is “confusion about
where financing comes from, my financing comes from construction union pension funds,
funded by blue collar workers, you hurt them by asking too much of developers”.
Furthermore, Erickson says that “expected returns are universal and return is
based on risk and pension liabilities. I have to hit certain benchmarks to get the financing;
they will not invest unless the return is right since they have to protect themselves and the
pensions”. He goes on to say that “it’s simple arithmetic - long division, the net operating
income divided by the total cost equals the cap rate accepted by the institutional
market… if you don’t hit 5% you won’t get the financing”. Finally, Erickson believes it is
“unrealistic to think any project can be overloaded with aﬀordable units; for example,
25% aﬀordable would be great, but we can’t do it with current financing. If we can do
15% and you kill it because it’s not 25% - is that better?”. Erickson also mentioned that
he would support another city-wide bond to raise money for aﬀordable housing
production and also suggested that the City could forgive real estate taxes on new
projects for 15 years if they provide 20% aﬀordable units, which could stimulate more
construction.
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Another approach to funding aﬀordable housing, especially 100% aﬀordable
housing projects, is via public funding. According to Fernando Martí, “we will reach
housing aﬀordability via public investment’. He says that elected oﬃcials and the budget
“play a role” and that the City needs to “pass progressive taxes and make good budget
decisions”. Martí believes that “income inequality and wealth inequality have driven the
current aﬀordability crisis”, but that “wealth also provides revenue [via taxes] that needs
to be harnessed”. He believes that the City must preserve and build aﬀordable units and
act quickly to do so. He also recognizes the need to bring in stable investment over time
and find consistent funding streams that are not “susceptible to ups and downs of
business cycles”, such as developer impact and linkage fees.
Martí thinks that the passage of Proposition C (‘our city, our home’) and
Proposition I (real estate transfer tax) are in-line with this approach, but that these funds
are quite spread out between new aﬀordable housing construction, tenant subsidies, and
the preservation of SROs, to name a few. Martí also knows that these funding sources are
far from enough to meet the need, especially given the new RHNA goals, and states that
“we have some buckets of money that add up to half or less of the need for aﬀordable
housing for RHNA, so we are short”. Looking beyond the City, he believes that this is “an
exciting moment for housing preservation” given the state level housing preservation
funding available, but reminds that the federal government is still reticent to fund much
needed public housing.
Ultimately, Martí believes that the Housing Stability Fund, created by Proposition I,
can be a way to realize the City’s aﬀordable housing goals and that exploring social
housing and limited equity housing co-ops can be a solid option moving forward. While
he laments the fact that San Francisco cannot implement a local income tax or change
the property tax structure due to state law, he says these taxes can “be replicated” and
that “we can do more with the [tax] structures we have”. Finally, Martí also proposes the
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creation of Infrastructure Finance Districts (IFDs), which use a form of tax increment
financing to divert property taxes with the IFD to pay for public projects, such as housing.
According to Calvin Welch, to achieve true aﬀordability “you have to remove the
housing from the market to make it permanently aﬀordable… there needs to be some
kind of community ownership”. He says that BMRs, ADUs, and density bonuses are
“market based solutions” that are “good for developers but don’t work well for residents”
and that “these programs serve a higher earning population [that] should be served after
people with greater housing needs”. He also remarks that the “idea that the problem is we
don’t build enough housing isn’t right, it’s aﬀordable housing that we don’t build enough
of, not housing in general. This distinction isn’t really made in academia or politics”. To
finance more aﬀordable housing production Welch also suggests more taxes on the City’s
highest earners, “we have a wealthy city and we can tax the wealthy sector and use those
taxes to bring down the cost of housing, we know how to do that, it's not impossible”.

Zoning and Land Use Regulation in San Francisco

The topics of zoning, or rather rezoning/up-zoning, and the (de)regulation of land use
have also become key issues in the debate around (aﬀordable) housing production in San
Francisco. According to Laura Foote, the core initial block to building aﬀordable housing
is the current low density zoning restrictions that exist in much of San Francisco. She
believes that the zoning should be the same throughout the city and allow “a minimum of
100 units on each parcel”. She also thinks that new housing projects should be permitted
‘by-right’ rather than via the current discretionary review process. She reminds that
current zoning in the City “replicated red-lining”, which is why it is diﬀerent in certain
neighborhoods, and that it upholds previous racist land use regulations. While she
acknowledges up-zoning has the potential to create displacement, she believes tenant
protections should be in place to prevent such outcomes. Foote also believes that
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previous studies on up-zoning that have focused on “spot up-zoning” have placed too
much potential value on a few parcels and that the outcomes of “blanket up-zoning”,
which she supports, would “diﬀuse the value” over a wider area.
Similar views were shared by Sam Moss, who is also supportive of up-zoning and
eliminating the discretionary review process. According to Moss, “we need rules for the
whole city and we need to stick to them - the rules should be the rules”. He also points
out that if San Francisco’s Housing Element were to be non-complaint, a scenario he
believes to be very possible, then market-rate developers would be able to circumvent
the City’s current zoning laws and discretionary review process and build ‘by right’ if the
building contains 20% aﬀordable units - this is what is known as the ‘Builder’s Remedy’.
Given the spotty track record of housing production in San Francisco, Moss believes that
the state “knows we haven’t built so why would we this time? They know we won’t build
so HCD won’t pass us, things like [469] Stevenson will factor in”.
Todd David also believes that the City’s current zoning and permitting process is
holding back the construction of new housing, both aﬀordable and market-rate. He
recommends adopting a streamlined approval process for housing projects that are
complaint, and says approvals can sometimes take four to five years. He also says that
allowing multi-family housing on the west side of there City is key and that we need to
“eliminate single family zoning in San Francisco as its history is rife with racism and
exclusion - it doesn’t belong on our maps anymore”. In David’s opinion, “every lot should
be zoned for four to six units at a minimum - that would be a good first step”. David also
acknowledges that up-zoning could cause displacement and recommends the institution
of tenant protections if demotions occur. These would include temporary housing, moving
expenses, and a right to return to the unit at the same rent. As stated by David, “I see a
win-win path - we can add housing and not displace tenants”.
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Another supporter of up-zoning was Oz Erickson, who believes the “best solution
is to increase height and density along transport corridors such as Van Ness and Geary…
these should go to 80 feet and have unlimited density… we could add tens of thousands
of units over time”. Erickson also says that increased density should not be feared by
homeowners, and cites the Marina and Pacific Heights as examples of neighborhoods
with mixed densities that have high home values. He says that “more density is good for
housing and it won’t change the quality of life”.
However, Fernando Martí was slightly more tepid in his views on rezoning and
deregulation. According to Martí, deregulation could be considered a “false solution”.
While he believes “zoning is a tool to get to aﬀordability, just like public investment” he
says “when oﬃcials talk about changing zoning they are really talking about changing the
value of land by changing the law”. As stated by Martí, “zoning sets the value of land - if
you can build more you can make more”. While he acknowledges that rezoning could be
used to create more aﬀordability he also asks, “are we getting a greater public benefit by
changing these laws? That should be the focus - on what can be achieved with these
changes, how does it get us closer to aﬀordability?”.
Similar views are held by Calvin Welch who believes that “deregulation doesn’t
work well” and that “all policies are local and all eﬀective land use and housing programs
are local”. Welch goes on to say that “for us to get the type of housing we need, it needs
to be done at the local level via elected oﬃcials”. Welch also shared a pertinent story
about up-zoning when recounting how Jeremy Ets-Hokin, the former owner of Playland
by the beach, told the San Francisco Planning Commission in the 1970s that “you can
zone an area to be a gold mine, but it doesn’t mean you are going to find gold”.
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Market Rate Housing and the Real Estate Market
The role of market-rate housing and the overall real estate market have also been hotly
debated by diverse factions within San Francisco housing politics. For example, Sam
Moss states that “San Francisco hates market-rate housing more than it likes aﬀordable
housing”. On the other hand, he says the State does not believe market-rate housing is
“the devil”. Indeed, much of the YIMBY narrative relies on the concept that an increase in
market rate housing, which provides more housing overall, will help alleviate the housing
shortage and promote filtering that will ultimately lead to more aﬀordability. This sentiment
is echoed by developer Oz Erickson, who says that “when you increase market-rate
housing you stabilize rents”, and that stabilizing or lowering rents should “be the goal of
any city leader”. Erickson also remarks that “each time we build it's 5.57% on real estate
taxes to the City, which is extra revenue for them, so the City would be losing lots of
money if they were to stop market rate production”.
Yet Calvin Welch questions whether or not developers will continue to build
market-rate housing if their overall profits begin to shrink. He argues that allowing
developers to build ‘by right’ does not mean they will actually do so since “part of that
dynamic is holding back development until the time is right… since they don’t want the
price to fall”. Welch goes on to say that, “the academic left has been won over by
YIMBYism and the belief that if we build more it will all cost less - but this ignores the
financialization of housing and the fact that the market isn’t about producing cheap
housing, if it ever was”. He believes that “housing is no longer about shelter” and is
instead intertwined with the stock market and investment opportunities and that these
facts cannot be ignored.
Welch goes on to say that “trickle down housing policies do not work for low
income city dwellers” and states that “if increased density automatically lowered housing
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costs, San Francisco and New York wouldn’t be expensive, but they are the most
expensive… density is not the automatic answer to aﬀordability, the densest cities in the
US have the highest housing costs and they continue to rise”. When discussing the real
estate industry overall, Welch calls it the “sugar coated poison of this country” and says
that it “catches really clever people in its clutches”. He says that political parties,
academics, and elected oﬃcials do not seem to understand this, but the that “the people
who get it are in the community”, and that they will ultimately provide the solutions to the
current crisis if anyone can.

The RHNA Process and Allocations

Looking at the overall RHNA process and the new allocations for San Francisco, Laura
Foote says she is a “fan of the process, despite its messiness”. She believes that it is
feasible for San Francisco to meet its RHNA allocations over the next cycle, if San
Francisco is dedicated to achieving these goals. Foote says that “San Francisco has one
of the worst permitting processes in the US” and this combined with its current zoning
laws has made it diﬃcult for developers to build. Foote also thinks that the HCD will be
“skeptical” of San Francisco’s Housing Element once submitted given that the “likelihood
of development in San Francisco is an issue”, since projects like 469 Stevenson were
ultimately stopped by the Board of Supervisors. She says that it will be up to the Board of
Supervisors to vote to adopt the changes prescribed by the Housing Element, and if they
do not do this there is strong possibility that the Housing Element will be rejected by the
State.
Sam Moss echoes the thoughts of Foote, stating that “the Housing Element is
going to be an issue” and that it may not be approved. He also believes San Francisco
can reach its lofty RHNA goals, but that the City will need help from the State to do so. In
Moss’ opinion, “there is a ton of land to build on, but the City won’t do it”. He also
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reminds that SB 35 and SB 828 “rewrote the Housing Element”, and that the state
Attorney General Rob Bonta now has the power to sue cities for not taking the necessary
steps to meet their mandated goals. Overall, Moss said he is “excited” by the prospect of
the City’s Housing Element being rejected, as this would trigger the “Builder’s Remedy”,
which he says would allow for ‘by-right’ construction of any housing project anywhere in
the City as long at it contains 20% aﬀordable units.
When discussing the feasibility of achieving the RHNA goals for the next cycle,
Todd David was less bullish. He believes that San Francisco will not be able to meet its
RHNA goals as the City has consistently struggled to do so in the past. He says the
“Housing Element process will be fascinating” to watch play out at the Board of
Supervisors and believes that the State will push back if the Housing Element submitted
is not “straightforward”. Again, he says that rezoning the westside and passing
streamlining legislation are both essential for San Francisco to come close to meeting its
RHNA goals and worries that if rezoning occurs without streamlining many projects will
not actually be built.
When discussing the feasibility of San Francisco meeting is new RHNA allocations
Oz Erickson says it will be “impossible” to reach these goals over the next cycle. He
reminds that the most units that have ever been built in San Francisco in one year is
5,000 and that “the average amount of units built per year over the last 20 years was
2,500”. He estimates that the cost to build the required aﬀordable units will be $20 billion
and that the new goals will be “impossible to meet without this money”. He asks, “where
is $20 billion coming from to build 100% aﬀordable housing without extra tax revenues?”.
Fernando Martí had a similar response when asked if these new goals were
reachable. He ask, “has the City ever built at that scale? Have investors ever invested at
that scale?”. Just like Erickson, he also states that “the City has only built 5,000 units in a
few years - in the early 1960s during urban renewal and during the more recent high tech
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boom in 2015-16”. He points out that “historically, San Francisco has managed to build
half of its aﬀordable housing goals, but now this will be about 1/6 with the huge increase”.
Martí also believes that there is a “disconnect between the goals and the funding
available - both for aﬀordable and market rate housing” and questions how the City will
be able to get the hefty investment needed.
Calvin Welch also shared some strong opinions on the subject. When asked
whether the City could meet its new RHNA goals Welch replied “who says we need
80,000 units? We have 50,000 units approved but not built. Does the market hold back
approved units? Do they not wait to build housing?”. Welch says that “these policies
don’t require the developer to build the unit in a reasonable amount of time” and that “you
can’t force market rate developers to build because they won’t, due to the capitalist
system”. When it comes to the RHNA requirements aﬀordable housing Welch says that
these “should be mandatory” and that “if you are taking a subsidy from the government
then there needs to be timeline on completion”. Ultimately, Welch sees the RHNA
requirements as a “trickle down” solution and part of what he calls a “real estate hustle”.

The Role of the State

As the State of California has been given increasing power over local housing decisions
via the new RHNA process, the level and type of state intervention or assistance needed
is also an important topic of discussion. According to Laura Foote, the role of the State
can “be bigger” when it comes to providing both funding and punishments. She says that
“San Francisco can no longer ignore state law - that isn’t an available path anymore”. She
thinks that punishments from the State need to be eﬀective when a city pushes back
against RHNA goals, and the Attorney General should step in and sue when appropriate.
Foote also believes that the State could give more money to cities for housing as the
need is so high and laments that San Francisco could lose its state funding for aﬀordable
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housing if its Housing Element is non-compliant, “its not really fair, the Board of
Supervisors deserves the blame, not the whole city”.
Sam Moss also thinks that the State needs to provide more financial help for San
Francisco to meet its RHNA aﬀordable housing allocations. He says “we have $3-5 billion
coming from the State for aﬀordable housing, but they need to provide way more”. He
also suggests “turning California Section 8 back on” since once builders are able to get
direct deposit subsidies from the government they are able to get the necessary loans to
build.
When discussing the issue of state intervention and assistance, Todd David thinks
the State should be “both the carrot and the stick”. As the State has an interest in seeing
cities produce housing they also have a role in helping them do so, he says. However, he
remarks that “San Francisco has had local control of its housing for 100 years, and the
State is only intervening now in the last couple of years. Have the outcomes for housing
been good over the last 100 years? Is housing diverse and aﬀordable?”. David believes
that the answer to these questions is “no”, and goes on to state that “one can objectively
say that if you are lower or middle income in San Francisco the housing market has not
worked out for you”. David then suggests trying a “diﬀerent strategy” because the current
approach “hasn’t worked”. He believes that San Francisco would have never planned for
this amount of housing if the State did not mandate it and thinks the State should push
more changes on the City that include streamlining and zoning reform. David also
suggests that the State use this year’s budget surplus to help fund aﬀordable housing
production in places like San Francisco. He says, right now, the best approach the State
can take is to let “San Francisco work it out locally and provide money to help, but if
you’re not making progress we will step in. It's going this way so far, more or less, and it
feels appropriate to me”.
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Fernando Martí also supports state intervention in certain situations. He asks, “are
cities refusing to build or do they not have suﬃcient resources?” He believes that if cities
are refusing to approve or build aﬀordable housing then state intervention is needed to
force them to integrate this housing “because they are segregating”. Martí also brings up
the subject of “soft markets”, which have land zoned for multi-family housing, but are too
far away from urban centers and therefore do not command investment. He says there is
a “broader red-lining that occurs by investors for hot markets” and wonders if the state
can use its power to make investors move into these ‘soft’ zones via transport incentives,
but cautions that a local understanding of housing and land use is also needed.
One Word and Main Block
Finally, each interviewee was asked to describe the current housing crisis in one word and
provide what they believed were the main blocks for building aﬀordable housing in San
Francisco. Their individual responses are listed below.
Laura Foote:

- One word: Shortage
- Main block: Low density zoning
Sam Moss:

- One word: Self-inflicted
- Main block: Discretionary permits and money/funding
Todd David:

- One word: Under-supply
- Main block: Four things: zoning reform; streamlining approval process; lack of funding;
political will
Oz Erickson:

- One word: Unrealistic
- Main block: Obtaining the necessary funding
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Fernando Martí:

- One word: Un-aﬀordability
- Main block: Lack of funding
Calvin Welch:

- One Word: Aﬀordability
- Main block: Lack of funding
As can be seen here, five out of the six participants cited funding as a key block for the
construction of aﬀordable housing in San Francisco. With massive funding shortfalls
predicted for the construction of aﬀordable housing over the next RHNA cycle, this block
is seemingly one that will continue to be in place unless new funding and revenue stream
and strategies are advanced at the local, regional, and state level.
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6. Conclusions
San Francisco has a long and complicated history concerning housing and zoning, and
many of the city’s current housing issues have deeper, historic roots. The current housing
shortage and aﬀordability crisis can be traced back to policy decisions made over the
past century that have limited the overall housing supply and the ability to build more.
While the demolition of older, aﬀordable housing stock via redevelopment and urban
renewal took thousands of units oﬄine forever, the expansion of oﬃce space for the
creation of a ‘corporate headquarters’ put the city in an even deeper housing hole. The
adoption of discretionary reviews by the Planning Department along with the CEQA
appeal process that began to be used (and abused) to block the development of housing
projects, especially for low-income households, has contributed to less housing being
built overall.
The City’s residential zoning, passed in 1978, made it illegal to build apartment
buildings in two-thirds of the city and severely limited its capacity for growth, all while
preserving predominantly upper class, single family home communities. This occurred as
large amounts of people were beginning to move back into cities around America in
greater numbers during the so-called ‘great inversion’. This caused demand for housing
at all income levels to rise dramatically due to undersupply. While there were a number of
factors that contributed to the current housing and aﬀordability crises, San Francisco’s
city government, whether knowingly or unknowingly, has also hastened and perpetuated
it in various ways.
Over the past four decades the City has done little to change its cumbersome
planning process, which has allowed for countless housing projects, especially lowincome, to be delayed or rejected. As the city’s zoning has remained largely unaltered this
has forced the majority of new development to the east side of the city where high density
buildings dominate. Over the last ten years over 90% of new housing built has been in
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buildings of 20+ units and the vast majority of these buildings are located in the
Downtown or South of Market Planning Districts. Indeed, the east side of the city has
taken on far more than its fair share of housing in the past decade, producing thousands
and thousands of units, while very few units have been added to the west side in this tenyear span. This extremely inequitable distribution of housing, especially aﬀordable
housing, is an imbalance that is past due for a shift.
While job growth continues to outpace housing production at a rate of about 8.5 to
1 and aﬀordable housing production struggles to make up 25% of the total housing units
added each year, the financial demographics of the city have also shifted. For example,
from 2010 to 2017 the percent of high wage earners (above 120% AMI) living in San
Francisco went from 41% to 55% of the total population, while low-wage earners (less
than 80% AMI) went from 44% to 31%. Although this can partly be attributed to job
growth in the high-wage tech sector, low-wage job growth has been similar in San
Francisco, but low-wage earners cannot aﬀord to live in the City.
Over the last twenty years especially, displacement has occurred at an astonishing
rate, and much of it can be traced to strong downward pressure put on the rental and
housing market by the city’s growing population of high-wage earners. As has been
shown, supply still matters. While adding more supply at market-rate levels may not
translate directly to more aﬀordability - i.e. lower income earners paying less rent - it does
take crippling pressure oﬀ the very taxed housing market, which responds to a glut of
high income bidders by evicting low income households. Creating more supply for an
already inflated high income market can help preserve the aﬀordability of older units and
limit overall displacement that high demand fuels in housing sub-markets.
Of course, to create more tangible aﬀordability for low to moderate income
households, more aﬀordable housing needs to be constructed and preserved. In San
Francisco this is accomplished primarily via the construction and preservation of 100%
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aﬀordable housing projects or the construction of inclusionary units in market-rate
buildings. In 2020, the San Francisco Planning Department’s Housing Aﬀordability
Strategies outlined an ambitious plan to tackle the current aﬀordability crisis. Their goal
was to build 5,000 total units each year, including 1,687 new aﬀordable units and 1,100
preserved/rehabilitated. Of these, 687 would be developer-built inclusionary units, while
the city (with a combination of local, state, and federal funds) would pay for the remaining
1,000 new aﬀordable and 1,100 preserved units. Because building aﬀordable housing is
expensive and there is little economic return on most units added the estimated cost per
year to reach this goal was set at $517 million (in 2020 dollars). While the City nearly met
this funding target in FY 2019-20 it has fallen far short in the past and will need to target
new funding and revenue sources to cover shortfalls in the coming years.
While these city goals were already ambitious for San Francisco, the RHNA
allocations for the next eight-year cycle are more than double these targets. For the 6th
RHNA cycle running from 2023 to 2031 San Francisco is required to build 82,069 units, or
10,258 units per year. Of the required units a total of 57%, or 46,598 units, will need to be
aﬀordable to households in the ‘very low’ to ‘moderate’ income brackets. The majority of
these allocated aﬀordable units will need to be for the ‘very low’ income category, with
20,867 units assigned - more than triple the previous cycle’s allocation of 6,234 units.
For perspective, in San Francisco only 2,317 units for ‘very low income’
households were completed over the last eight-year cycle, but ten times this amount will
be required for the next cycle (20,867 units). Over the last 20 years, more than 5,000 units
have only been built once in San Francisco (in 2016) and the average production of
aﬀordable units over the last ten years is 1,059 units per year. This will need to ratchet up
to over 5,800 units per year over the next eight years to meet the new requirements for
‘very low’, ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ income households.
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According to the City’s Capital Plan, first realised in 2020, for San Francisco to
meet its production targets for ‘very low’, ‘low’ and ‘moderate-income’ housing over the
2022-2031 RHNA cycle, approximately $7 billion will be needed, which is $875 million per
year. Considerably more than the $503 million spent in FY 2019-20, which was the most
the City has ever spent on aﬀordable housing in one year. Yet, a recent planning report
provided to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in May 2022 has shown that the local
funding gap for aﬀordable housing construction in the first year of the new RHNA cycle is
much larger than these previous predictions. According to the report the local funding gap
for aﬀordable housing production in 2023 is estimated to be $1.3 billion. Additionally, this
gap is predicted to increase each year until 2029 with a total predicted local shortfall of
$14 billion over this seven year period. Currently, the City’s total spend per year on
aﬀordable housing is expected to drop below $300 million each year in the coming years,
which is well short of the billions needed.
For San Francisco to meet its mandated RHNA goals public spending and
construction will be required on an unprecedented scale. Right now, there are no
indicators that San Francisco has the funding available to build the allocated units at the
necessary speed given the previous record. That said, San Francisco does not need to
actually build over 82,000 units in the next eight years (at a pace of 10,000+ units per
year), it just needs to show the State and the HCD that it can via its upcoming Housing
Element. However, if San Francisco cannot put together a complaint Housing Element
that feasibly plans for the construction of 82,069 units, they will lose state funding for
aﬀordable housing and be subject to litigation and state planning intervention at the local
level.
In San Francisco’s Housing Element draft it has already been determined that the
city is short on capacity and that rezoning will be needed to accommodate the required
units. To accomplish this, the City is undertaking a rezoning program that will see the
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entire west side of the city up-zoned for higher densities. However, this rezoning will take
place over the next three years, which means that the 6th RHNA cycle will likely be half
complete before developers even have access to build on these rezoned parcels.
While the new, higher state housing allocations and mandated rezoning are
intended to foster more housing production, there are also big questions around the
actual outcomes and (perhaps) unintended consequences of such actions. As has been
discussed, rezoning has the potential to create rent and value ‘gaps’ that can lead to
speculation and/or gentrification if guardrails are not in place. In fact, there is concern
about whether much housing will be built at all since a study on spot up-zoning in
Chicago has shown that rising land prices and increased transactions followed up-zoning
there, but led to no actual housing being built (Freemark 2019a). Even with a feasible list
of inventory sites that provide capacity for the construction of 82,000 units over eight
years, a recent study from UCLA has shown that in San Francisco RHNA inventory sites
only had a 7-9% chance of development, and that roughly 70% of housing built over the
current RHNA cycle was constructed on non-inventory sites (Kupur et al. 2021).
If more housing is added in good time at all income levels as is desired, this would
help mitigate the overall housing shortage and take pressure oﬀ of rental submarkets and
older housing stock. However, it will be near impossible to meet the mandated aﬀordable
housing targets without huge amounts of additional funding and/or revenue, meaning that
the new RHNA process will likely not solve for aﬀordability. In addition, current economic
conditions including inflation and overall construction costs may challenge residential
development at all levels, especially as applications for new housing projects are reaching
lows not seen since after the 2008 recession.
Although housing is shelter, on the open market it has become a commodity as
land use has become increasingly financialized in large cites around the world. The only
way to make housing (permanently) aﬀordable is to remove it from the market - either
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through the construction of 100% aﬀordable projects or the preservation of existing
aﬀordable units. Yet this task will take a massive, unprecedented amount of public
spending to accomplish. While the approach the State is taking to stimulate housing
production via the RHNA process could be a step in the right direction over the long term
(if the needed housing gets built), without additional financing at the state level, large
cities like San Francisco will fail to meet their aﬀordable housing allocations by a wide
margin, meaning that the adoption of this new RHNA process will have little eﬀect on
overall aﬀordability.
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7. Recommendations
1. State Action: Use State Surplus to Fund Aﬀordable Housing Production
To build the required aﬀordable housing over the next RHNA cycle more funding is
mandatory. This can come from a variety of sources, but as RHNA allocations are statemandated, the State of California should be a first port of call for new funding streams.
Currently the State has a predicted surplus of around $97.5 billion (Myers 2022). If some
of these billions could be given to cities as one-time gifts to help them meet their RHNA
goals it would go a long way to alleviating current funding shortfalls and allow for more
aﬀordable units to be built.
The amount of funding each city receives could be predicated by the quantity of
units allocated. This approach would see San Francisco receive significant funding as the
city had the second highest requirements for total housing units in the state, behind only
Los Angeles. In San Francisco, one-time sources are often used on capital and
infrastructure projects and any new state funding could be put to use immediately by the
city in a number of ways. For example, the funds could be used to build new 100%
aﬀordable housing projects in San Francisco’s ‘well resourced’ areas on the westside of
the city, as is recommended by the city’s Housing Element and prompted by the state’s
RHNA process. Such funds could also be used to purchase older hotels and apartment
buildings to be converted into new or preserved aﬀordable housing units, similar to
Project Homekey, which operates at the state-level. Acquiring and rehabilitating such
buildings is one of the quickest and cheapest way to add and preserve aﬀordable housing
units and could help the City bring aﬀordable units online quickly to make tangible
progress towards the new RHNA goals.
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2. Fundraise for Aﬀordable Housing at the Regional and State Level
A new regional funding body known as the Bay Area Housing Finance Authority (BAHFA)
was established by Assembly Bill 1487 (Chiu, 2019). BAHFA is a key component of the
MTC/ABAG ‘Expanded Regional Housing Portfolio’ which is based on their “3Ps”:
protect, preserve, and produce to secure long-term aﬀordability (BAHFA 2021:1-6).
BAHFA is the first state-approved regional housing finance authority in California that
enables aﬀordable housing funding and financing at a multi-county, regional scale and the
2021-2022 California state budget already included $20 million to underwrite their work.
BAHFA has the power to raise revenue regionally from a variety of sources, including
voter approved taxes, such as a parcel tax, a per-employee ‘head tax’, and/or a gross
receipts tax; a commercial linkage fee, capped at $10 per square foot; issuance of
general obligation bonds; and grants or loans from public and private sources (BAHFA
2021: 11).
In addition to the fund-raising techniques above, BAHFA has the power and
responsibility to advocate for new state and federal resources to advance their ‘3Ps’
strategy. BAHFA can also harness existing regional preservation finance tools to maximize
their impact. These include MTC’s Bay Area Preservation Pilot (BAPP), which is a
revolving loan fund, and ABAG’s Bay Area Regional Energy Network (BayREN), which
which offers rebates, grants and technical assistance for energy and water upgrades at
ageing apartment buildings (BAHFA 2021: 17-18). Although BAHFA has yet to place the
first regional housing revenue measure on the ballot in all nine Bay Area counties, they
aim to do so at the next viable election opportunity. While funding from BAHFA will be
awarded competitively, San Francisco should be in a good position to leverage these
funding streams once they are operational given the new RHNA requirements and the
current housing crisis.
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Moving up from the regional to the state level, California should issue more bonds
to finance aﬀordable housing, especially as the most recent attempt to do so failed. First
proposed in 2020 and later amended in 2021, SB 5, later known as the the Aﬀordable
Housing Bond Act of 2022, would have authorized the issuance of bonds in the amount
of $6.5 billion pursuant to the State General Obligation Bond Law. The revenue from the
sale of these bonds would have been used to fund aﬀordable rental housing and
homeownership programs and was set to appear on the ballot for the statewide elections
on November 8th, 2022. Unfortunately, this bill died on February 1st, 2022 and was
‘Returned to Secretary of Senate pursuant to Joint Rule 56’46. As such, it is
recommended that the state senate work to produce a new bill that can be placed in front
of voters for the 2023 or 2024 election cycle.

3. Adopt and Issue Mini-Bonds in San Francisco
Mini-bonds, also known as micro-bonds or baby bonds, are a type of municipal bond
sold in denominations much lower than traditional bonds. Like standard municipal bonds
mini-bonds are debt securities issued by cities to fund their general operations and to
finance capital and infrastructure projects, such as 100% aﬀordable housing projects.
While traditional municipal bonds are typically sold in increments of $5,000, mini-bonds
can be issued in increments as low as $25-100, although they are usually sold in the
$500-1000 range (Axelrod 2018; Feller 2020).
Returns on mini-bonds are also significantly higher than traditional bonds since
mini-bonds are usually ‘zero-coupon’ bonds, where the principal plus the accumulated
interest is paid back all at once when the bond matures. As such, mini-bonds are
structured so that the payment on maturity doubles (or triples) the initial purchase price/
investment (Ely and Martell 2016: 27). This diﬀers from traditional municipal bonds, which
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are ‘current interest’ bonds that earn periodic interest on a quarterly, monthly, or yearly
basis. Because of this, the maturity for mini-bonds is much shorter than traditional
municipal bonds, e.g. 5-15 years vs. 30-40 years. Just like traditional municipal bonds,
the interest returned on mini-bonds is tax exempt.
Ultimately, mini-bonds provide more accessibility to the bond market because they
are more aﬀordable. As such, they can provide investment opportunities to a diverse set
of non-traditional investors, including historically marginalized populations (Ely and
Martell 2016: 39; Feller 2020). The sale of mini-bonds also creates a more equitable
distribution of tax-exempt investment opportunities, which are typically reserved for a
small segment of higher income residents and investors. As mini-bonds mature faster
than traditional securities and often feature higher returns they can also aid wealth
creation in lower income populations by turning consumers into investors (Feller 2020).
Finally, the issuance of mini-bonds allows community members to invest in local projects
where they can see progress in real time, which promotes citizen engagement and public
participation in debt financing, helping municipalities forge a link with the public that
fosters community involvement and investment as well as a sense of civic pride (Ely and
Martell 2016: 31; Axelrod 2018).
While mini-bonds have been issued in a number of cities throughout the US, both
Denver, CO and Cambridge, MA have been leading the way in mini-bond issuances in
recent years. Overall, mini-bond issuances have been successful for these municipalities,
as Denver sold $12 million of bonds in one hour in 2014 and Cambridge sold $2 million
worth in one week on its very first issuance in 2018 (Murray 2014; Burton 2017). The city
of Berkeley, CA is also currently looking into the use of blockchain technology to make
the purchasing of such bonds online easier and more secure (Armstrong 2021).
As San Francisco has a high population of adults, an above average median
income, numerous universities, and a very civically engaged population the sale of mini132

bonds would likely be a successful fund raising endeavour for the city. For example, in the
2020 election, 86.2% of San Francisco’s registered voters participated, which ranked
near the top for ‘large counties’ in California.47 In addition, 86.6% of the city’s population
is above 18 years of age and the median household income is just under $120,000 per
year,48 indicating a high number of potential bond purchasers with a significant amount of
disposable income. Finally, it has been shown that mini-bond issuances are especially
successful in college towns (Feller 2020) and San Francisco is home to 13 universities. All
of these factors combined should make San Francisco an ideal location for the issuance
of mini-bonds, which can be used to fund aﬀordable housing production.

4. Release Proposition I Funds
Proposition I, which proposed a transfer tax on real estate sales was passed by San
Francisco voters in November 2020 with 57.5% ‘yes’ vote.49 The proposition raised taxes
on real state transfers over $10 million by 5.5% and 6% on transactions over $25 million.
The intended use of this tax, as it was pitched to voters on the ballot, was to generate
funds to be spent on rent relief and social housing in San Francisco. However, because
the proposition was passed with a simple majority rather than a 2/3 majority, the funds
raised by Proposition I have gone directly to the general fund, where they are subject to
mayoral control. In 2021, Proposition I generated $128 million, and to date only $32
million (1/4) of this funding has been spent on rent relief with no money going towards
housing acquisition (Moench 2021).
However, in 2021 the Housing Stability Fund and Oversight Board, which was
created as part of the adoption of Proposition I, recommended that half of these funds,

https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2020-general/sov/03-voter-participation-stats-by-county.pdf;
https://calmatters.org/explainers/california-county-voted-the-most/
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$64 million, be spent on the preservation of aﬀordable housing via MOHCD’s Small Sites
Program (SSP). As of January 2021 there were 117 building with between 3-50 units that
were for sale which contained tenants vulnerable to eviction, and the Oversight Board
recommended that the Board of Supervisors use this money to purchase some of these
buildings to remove them from the market (Schneider 2021). While the Board of
Supervisors voted to do exactly that via a budget supplemental in an 8-3 ‘veto-proof’
vote in November 2021, the Mayor has declined to spend the funds as desired (ibid).
Proposition I generated $137 million this fiscal year (FY2021-2022) (Schneider
2022), which means there is now about $233 million in city coﬀers that could be spent on
aﬀordable housing that the Mayor is withholding. In March 2022, the Housing Stability
Fund and Oversight Board released a new set of recommendations for the use of these
funds which includes $60 million for land acquisition for 100% aﬀordable and educator
housing; $52 million for upgrades and repairs to existing aﬀordable housing and new
aﬀordable housing construction; $12 million for the Small Sites Program (on top of the
$64 million already allocated by the Board); and $9 million for the development of
innovative strategies such as social housing.50 To date, the mayor has rejected the
majority of these proposals and her current budget has only allocated an additional $14
million to aﬀordable housing (Schneider 2022). In fact, funding for MOHCD’s operations is
expected to drop by $53 million in 2023 to a total of $205 million (ibid).
While the Board and the Mayor are gearing up for contentious debates on the use
of these funds in the 2022-2023 budget process, it is highly recommended that the
money generated by Proposition I be used for the acquisition, construction, and
preservation of aﬀordable housing as the voters, the Board of Supervisors, and the
Oversight Board have made clear. This would allow for hundreds of aﬀordable units to be

https://sf.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/
HSFOB%20Recommendations%20FY%202022-23%20%28Approved%29.pdf
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acquired, constructed, and preserved relatively quickly and help the City inch closer to its
substantial yearly funding goals for aﬀordable housing production and preservation,
where it is currently severely underperforming.

5. Support an Aﬀordable Housing Streamlining Proposal
Both the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors are aiming to get somewhat competing
streamlining proposals for aﬀordable housing production on the November 2022 ballot
and it is important that at least one of these proposals moves forward given the diﬃcult
nature of the city’s permitting and discretionary review process that routinely takes over
two years for projects to navigate. While the Mayor’s proposal would likely apply to more
overall projects given its less stringent requirements on inclusionary unit percentages and
labor used, the Board’s proposal would ensure higher levels of aﬀordability and the use of
union labor; however, it would likely apply to less projects overall.
As these measures are rather similar, if both reach the ballot, which is possible, it
could be confusing for voters, and if both pass one would likely supercede the other.
Because the Mayor’s proposal would apply to a larger number of projects overall it would
likely provide more aﬀordable units in the long run, and union labor forces could still be
used on such projects. As such, if both measures reach the ballot it is recommended that
the Mayor’s streamlining proposal be passed over the Board’s version. However, if only
one measure reaches the ballot that proposal should be ratified by the voters regardless,
since the streamlining of aﬀordable housing projects must occur for the city to even begin
to come close to reaching its RHNA goals over the next eight years.
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